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Abstract  
In order to retain or upgrade core competence and sustainability, companies 
seek for global expansion and conglomeration. Consequently, mergers and 
acquisition (M&A) has become the most highly possible route for enterprises to 
pursue future growth in the fast way. Although the historical record shows a 
higher failure rate, the M&A waves do not appear to exhibit a declining trend in 
past decades. This paper illustrates the financial evaluation of a M&A activity. By 
using the Discount Cash Flow (DCF) method and Market Multiple model, it 
demonstrates and expresses the value differing from the assumptions and 
conditions that are adopted in the calculation. Meanwhile, through the specific 
FDVH VWXG\ RI %HQ4¶V IDLOXUH WR WDNHRYHU 6LHPHQV 0RELOH 'LYLVLRQ LQ KDQGVHW
industry, it brings an argument that is significant in its own right, but is also a 
mixture of diverse issues involving financial evaluation, culture management in 
cross-broad circumstance, shareholder value maximisation and agency problem 
as well. Moreover, the objective of this paper is to stress on the evaluation on 
the target company during the pre-acquisition period, which requires careful due 
diligence to minimise potential risks and errors in value prediction in the 
beginning. Meanwhile, it also points out that the success of post-acquisition 
integration is highly relevant to the management strategy, but a failure to 
conduct it could lead to synergy that is not produced as early as expected and 
continuing operation expenditures that can cause a severe financial burden to 
the acquirer, which will change its capital structure and undermine its 
competition and business capability on the market as well. The focus on the M&A 
case of BenQ merge with Siemens implicates relevant topics, including the 
conflict between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and shareholder value 
maximisation. In addition, the interrelation between investment bank and 
enterprises involved in the M&A activities with the possible conflict against 
shareholder due to the concern of agency problem results in the inappropriate 
investment. Finally, it concludes that the future projection needs to be made on 
the basis of every aspect in business world; financial evaluation cannot be the 
singular element to accomplish successful M&A unless supported by all other 
strategic fits in operation. 
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Introduction  
 
With information technology becoming more common, internet application and 
telecommunication, international business connections have became more 
complex in more recent years. At the same time, national boundaries are getting 
vague resulting in the fiercely competitive and challenging environment that 
companies have to face. In order to retain or upgrade core competence and 
sustainability, companies seek for global expansion and conglomeration. As a 
result, mergers and acquisition (M&A) has become the most highly possible 
route for enterprises to pursue future growth. Moreover, due to the deregulation 
of related M&A rules with the trends of privatisation and liberalisation enables 
global capital flows to be utilised efficiently, which further foster the M&A 
environment in the world market.  
 
The most recent curve of M&A activity since 2004 can be attributed to 
macroeconomic recovery and several drivers. First of all, many firms view M&A 
as a primary means to pursue higher shareholder return when they utilise cost 
cutting and operational effectiveness exhaustively to improve profitability. In 
addition, retain earnings of corporations and share price appreciation in M&A 
activities have supported acquirers to leverage their internal financing by 
VZDSSLQJWDUJHWILUPV¶YDOXHOHVVSULYDWHVWRFN0RUHRYHUUHODWLYHO\ ORZLQWHUHVW
rates in historical record enable acquirers employ cost-effective financing costs 
to support the M&A growth (Sherman A.J. et al., 2006). Meanwhile, 31,233 
deals transactions, valued at $1.9 trillion, were announced in 2004. Many large 
industries, in particular, energy and power, financial services, and 
telecommunications, leading by their transaction value, have experienced a 
strong consolidation, and high technology has dominated in terms of the total 
number of deals (see Table 1). In Taiwan, small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) have played major roles in economic development. Taiwan has been a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2002; however, this trend 
causes instant shock to Taiwan-based corporations because they encounter 
IRUHLJQFRPSHWLWRUV¶DEXQGDQWresources in capital and advanced technology that 
may threat domestic growth. Therefore, the Taiwanese government works out 
the M&A regulation to encourage domestic M&A activities in order to strengthen 
business operations and to underpin economic development (Tsai H.M., 2006).  
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Table 1. Last twelve-months' deal activity by industry sector (as of 
May 2005) 
Target Macro Industry 
Deal Value 
($Mil) 
Market 
Share 
Number 
of Deals 
Average 
Deal Size 
($Mil) 
Energy and Power 327,947 15.6 2188 $150 
Financials 305,841 14.6 3835 $80 
Telecommunications 209,831 10 957 $219 
Real Estate 178,132 8.5 1382 $129 
Media and Entertainment 165,446 7.9 2363 $70 
Industrials 157,365 7.5 3892 $40 
Materials 145,673 6.9 3131 $47 
Healthcare 141,880 6.8 1699 $84 
Retail 128,631 6.1 1467 $88 
High Technology 123,727 5.9 4348 $28 
Consumer Products and Services 123,163 5.9 2930 $42 
Consumer Staples 92,676 4.4 2022 $46 
Government and Agencies 903 0 34 $27 
Industry Total 2,101,215 100 30.25 $69 
Source: Thomson Financials         
 
This paper illustrates the financial evaluation on M&A activity. In the past, the 
relevant research of valuation more focus on large and stable business; however, 
in recent years, the emergence of technology companies, such as computer & 
peripherals or semiconductors, and new technology firms, such as Dot.Com 
companies, reveals an interesting argument that how conventional valuation 
models are adopted in valuing these technology firms with features of limited 
history and/or negative earnings. Darmodaran (2000) develops some new ways 
from traditional model by using adjusted Discount Cash Flow (DCF) method to 
evaluate technology companies.  
 
$ VSHFLILF FDVH VWXG\ RI %HQ4¶V IDLOXUH WR WDNHRYHU 6LHPHQV0RELOH 'LYLVLRQ LQ
2005 is investigated here. Although the target ± Siemens Mobile Device Division 
is not a dot.com business, its features of negative earnings and limited history in 
technology firm category are still qualified to be employed by adjusted Free Cash 
Flow valuation for its business value. Besides, how the discount rate and growth 
rate play their influential role in the business valuation process is examined as 
well. Meanwhile, the difference between valuation result and real price in this 
deal is discussed to explore other implications associating with the motives of 
the acquisition and other causes influencing value calculation. 
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BenQ Corp., acting as an original electronics manufacturer (OEM) for global 
brands such as Nokia and Motorola, is a well-known company in Taiwan but 
lacks global branding to speed up its own brand mobile phone business. As a 
UHVXOW WR FKDQJH LQ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V LQFXPEHQW EXVLQHVV SKDVH WKURXJK WKH
EX\RXWDFWLYLW\EHFRPH%HQ4¶VSULRULW\WRH[SDQGLWVPDUNHWLQJQHWZRUN4LVGD
Annual Report, 2004). Siemens AG, the largest engineering conglomerate in 
Europe, has three major businesses including the healthcare, industry, and 
energy with 15 operation units (Siemens AG Annual Report, 2004). Yet, the high 
competition and design lag in new products caused continuous price-wars to its 
handset sales. Thus, Siemens AG decided to sell the loss-making handset 
business (Canibol H.P., 2006). In September 2006, BenQ Mobile filed for 
bankruptcy and it raised a widespread criticism against BenQ and Siemens 
(Wearden G., 2007). 
 
This case study is significant in its own right but is also a mixture of diverse 
issues which involves financial evaluation, culture management in cross-broad 
circumstance, shareholder value maximisation and principal-agent problem as 
well. The objective of this paper is to stress on the evaluation on the target 
company during the pre-acquisition period, which requires careful due diligence. 
Besides, the success of post-acquisition integration is highly relevant to the 
management strategy. Inefficient managerial practices not only delay the 
resource transfer and experience sharing but also interrupt the conduction of 
internal operational policies. The worse matter after an acquisition would be 
synergy that is not be produced as expected early and continuing operation 
expenditures that cause a severe financial burden to the acquirer and even 
change its capital structure. Once the acquirer cannot bear the pressure 
financially, it has no choice but to give up the merger even and therefore attract 
criticisms for the resulting unemployment. As a result, this implicate topic in 
FRUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\&65WRJRDJDLQVWFRPSDQ\¶VSURILWDELOLW\ZKLFK
represents shareholder value maximisation. Furthermore, the M&A drivers, 
investment banks, play an important role to match up the transaction in the 
modern era; thus, this paper also examines the interrelation between their 
business motives and principal-agent problem in organisations involved in M&A. 
The extended topics bring cross-border discussion and potential for more in 
depth research suggested for subsequent investigations. This has both 
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theoretical and practical implications, which conclude that a single factor, such 
as financial evaluation, cannot accomplish a successful acquisition; there are 
other essential and crucial elements that supplement the financial valuation in a 
more appropriate and objective way. All in all, the future projection is to be 
made on the basis of every aspect in the business world. 
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1. Methodology  
Shareholder value maximisation is regarded as a goal of an enterprise in order 
to pursue sustainable growth. In spite of the challenging and competitive 
environment continuing to weaken business profitability, a foresighted enterprise 
can still retain or even strengthen its value and core competence through a 
serious of strategic activities.  The strategy of Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is 
one of highly possible routes that enable a firm to obtain economic benefits in a 
relatively short-term horizon. However, the failure of M&A can not only endanger 
the future growth of a company but can also cause the prompt loss in existing 
business scope and its financial position. Consequently, evaluation of an 
HQWHUSULVH¶V YDOXH SOD\V D VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQIOXHQWLDO UROH LQ WKH GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
process of the investment.  
 
This study seeks to understand how an organisation is evaluated by market 
multiple and discount cash flow approaches. Moreover, in seeking the possible 
answers and recommendations for the questions, a case study approach is 
adopted. The case is based on the secondary information which includes annual 
UHSRUWVPDJD]LQHVQHZVSDSHUVDQGRIILFLDODQQRXQFHPHQWRI ILUPV¶ZHEVLWHV
to analyse and outline the outcomes. The value estimation of the target 
company will be worked out and compared with its real price of the takeover to 
arrive at the analysis in depth. Furthermore, a case study is fitting because other 
non-financial factors should be concerned as well in the evaluation analysis 
although they are restrictedly incorporated or often ignored in the consideration 
of M&A activity. The aim in this case study highlights that in keeping with the 
appropriate financial valuation is a key to step in the successful opportunities of 
EXVLQHVVH[SDQVLRQ,QWKHPHDQWLPHWKHDOLJQPHQWZLWKµVRIW¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ
strategic policies, such as cross-broader management, integration of culture 
difference, and appropriate recommendations of investment bank to the choice 
of M&A activity in a changing market underpins a successful acquisition with 
outstanding performance in the long run. Conversely, the acquirer may be put in 
a highly risky position with exhausted resource if the takeover fails.  
 
Although the enterprise value has various definitions, such as liquidation value, 
book value, fair market value, and collateral value, and it depends on different 
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purposes to deliver meanings for specific users. In this paper, the enterprise 
value reflects the market value in terms of the financial stance. Prior to the 
evaluation of the target company, there are essential aspects which should be 
examined as well. Firstly, the background incorporating its business vision, 
management goals, product scopes, market position, competition analysis, 
industrial trends, and future prospects. Moreover, to explore the historical 
financial statements in terms of ratio analysis is helpful. Even though financial 
statement is backward-looking, it still implicates useful clues that could be 
analysed to get further comprehension with regarding to the historic policies and 
management patterns in companies which are interested in M&A activities. 
Meanwhile, risk analysis which includes qualitative and quantitative 
determinations helps investors to well identify the real value of the target firm. 
 
In the process of evaluation, the determinative reasons to appraise the deal of 
Siemens Mobile Division taken over by the BenQ by using market multiple and 
discount free cash flows approaches are as follows. Firstly, brand marketing is 
the primary concern for BenQ to acquire Siemens Mobile Division. Besides, 
6LHPHQV¶V FRPSOHWHG GLVWULEXWLRQ FKDQQHOV LQ (XURSHDQ PDUNHW FDQ XQGHUSLQ
BenQ to establish and expand its product position to cross Asia and move 
forward. Thus, the expected revenue of Siemens Mobile Division can be 
estimated and then discounted to generate its enterprise value. Secondly, 
globalisation eliminates national boundaries and the merger of Siemens 
handsets enables BenQ become the 6th largest marker in the world (Nystedt D., 
2005). As a result, the comparators can be selected from the major global 
competitors with public financial statements and their estimates of value can be 
assessed by market multiples. On the other hands, the consolidated financial 
statements of Siemens group provide limited information with regard to its 
mobile division. Therefore, access to two valuation methods could be 
implemented under conditional assumptions associating solely to merely 
Siemens handsets business. The detailed assumptions and presuppositions are 
described in the next section.  
 
Discount free cash flow (DCF) approach focuses on the generation of future cash 
flows. The value of the firm equals the sum of projected cash flows for a 
planning period, which pluses a terminal value and then discounts the amount 
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back to the present date. As a result, synergy is demanded to be included if the 
information is sufficient to help develop reasonable perdition (Stampf et al.1992). 
There are three steps of DCF analysis laid out as follows.Step1: estimate the 
planning time and the amount of expected free cash flows (FCF). FCF can be 
expressed as the result of formula that Profit before Interest and Tax (PBIT) + 
Depreciation Expense - [Changes in Working Capital]-Net Investment in Fixed 
Assets ±Tax. The FCF comes from the initial planning periods and the end of 
projected period. In general, market multiple and perpetuity assumption with 
appropriate discount rate are two ways to capitalise the expected earnings. 
Step2: find out the risk discount rate. To an investor, it is an expected rate of 
return or the required cost of capital. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
is adopted here to evaluate the risk. However, the inherent limitation probably 
provides insufficient information. This is because the method merely discounts 
the cash flow by a singular expected return rate that may reflect restrictively all 
the cost and benefits if the original capital structure is changed. Step3: calculate 
the enterprise value (EV), the present value of the expected cash flows, and 
share value comes out after the EV is divided by the share numbers. Although to 
project future earnings is difficult, to develop varied business operations and to 
consider historical operation performance is necessary to narrow down the 
possible errors and distortions.  
 
Furthermore, a market comparison approach is applied in the analysis as well. 
How much a company worth, which is trusted by investors, is worth within the 
market and what a picture that market multiple would like to indicate. 
Accounting principles and disclosure requirements that vary in different countries 
may affect results and the ideal comparable company that are similar to the 
target company is unlikely to be found in every aspect (Stampf et al.1992). 
Moreover, the well-functioning market is not the proposition; thus, the share 
price may be affected by subjective factors. Meanwhile, the future growth value 
is probably underestimated. In spite of the possible drawbacks and limitations 
for this method, the major purpose of DCF method adoption is to complement 
with each other and to make the evaluation more reliable. Therefore, in the 
market multiple analysis, the differences of accounting and related principles in 
these comparable firms are ignored, and the inflation expectations, general 
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economic and political risks in this analysis are supposed to be same as well in 
the market multiple approach.  
 
In this selective case study of Siemens Mobile Division acquired by BenQ, its 
final result failed and the period of acquisition merely lasted one year after the 
official announcement. Hence, possible factors which are hidden behind this 
failed case are worthwhile enough to be examined, except for the company 
valuation in pre-acquisition. As for what is mentioned in the previous section, 
resource integration of two different firms bears relatively high risk. If the 
expected cash flow does not take this aspect into account, overestimated return 
and underestimated threats can occur. The connection between financial and 
non-financial considerations before and after the M&A forces the synergy to be 
generated in different degrees. Moreover, there is no exactly accurate evaluation 
of an acquisition but how it closes to a real situation in the business world. 
Different buyers might interpret a same target firm in various values because 
they aim at creating different synergy from business viewpoints. 
 
Although outcomes of M&A performed relatively high failure according to the 
historic records, the trend does not be ceased or decreased. In many cases, 
investment bankers who bring financial expertise and capabilities play an 
intermediary role in bridging sellers and buyers. Through channels provided by 
investment banks, the transactions of M&A may not be time-consuming and 
consist of costly activities because buyers who express an interest in acquiring 
can find out the target quicker than they process by themselves and vice versa. 
The abundant resources and information that investment banks have, offer 
acquirers access to the expertise in valuation and negotiation (Sherman A.J. and 
Hart M.A. 2006, P38). However, M&A business in investment banks generate 
their major revenue with relatively lower expenses compared to other business 
lines. High commission base, at least 1% of the transaction deal, drives advisers 
to match up the M&A (Mergers & Acquisitions, 2009). Under this condition, 
would the role of investment banks in the negotiating process of M&A strengthen 
principle-agent problem in acquiring or target firms? In particular, if managers 
with a hubris tendency (Roll, 1986) pursue growth maximisation complying with 
DQ DGYLVHU¶V DWWUDFWLYH SDFNDJLQJ RQ WKH µFRPPRGLW\¶ ZRXOG LW HQDEOHV WKH
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acquirer overlook potential risk and make wrong decisions? This is another issue 
that will be explored in this study. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 M&A Theories 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) involves a complicated and challenging 
processes not only to corporate and financial strategies but also to the 
management science of buying, selling, and the integration of different 
FRPSDQLHV ³0HUJHUV´ DQG ³DFTXLVLWLRQ´ DUH GLIIHUHQW LQ WKHLU GHILQLWLRQV ,Q D
merger, a new organisation comes out after the combination of two individual 
firms and both forms end to exist. This pattern, known DV³FRQVROLGDWLRQ´DVZHOO
produces a new company name and complies with a new branding. Acquisition, 
ZKLFKLVNQRZQDV³EX\RXW´RU³WDNHRYHU´V\QRQ\PRXVO\LPSOLHVWKDWWKHSRZHU
of ownership and management is transferred to the acquiring companies for 
business operation. There are two basic types in payment implicated here. One 
is the acquisition of shares. The board of acquirer raises the offer for the voting 
shares of another company. The target of this offer can be the board of the 
acquired firm or a tender offer to the public. Another type is the acquisition of 
asset. Part or all of the assets of the target company involves the title transfer to 
the acquiring firm (Muller D.C., 1969). 
 
Turning to Buckley P.J.(2002), one finds out that mergers and acquisitions can 
be conventionally classified in terms of economic effects as well. Firstly, 
horizontal merger means that two firms produce similar products in the same 
sector and the combination can enlarge the scale of economic to reduce 
production cost, expand the market share with better pricing power, increase 
debt capability and possible tax benefits, and reduce redundant expenditures in 
R&D, equipments, and related management cost. In addition, vertical merger 
indicates that two companies in the same industry have business correlation. 
Forward integration and backward integration are two patterns of this merger. 
The advantages include reducing transaction cost, stabilizing material supply and 
quality assurance, completing distribution channels and flexible inventory 
management, and enhancing technology innovation. Furthermore, two 
companies that operate different business lines in the same industry are defined 
as congeneric merger. Finally, two organisations which operate in different 
sectors without business correlations and are integrated to generate benefits, 
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such as decreasing financial risk and increasing management efficiency, are 
called conglomerate merger. To further decompose this merger, incorporating 
market extension, product extension, and pure conglomerate mergers are three 
patterns (Kitching J.1967). 
 
A study by Frank J.R et al.(1988) show that M&A can be classified in terms of 
payment. First of all, cash payment to the target firm is the first way; yet, the 
acquiring company may bear higher risk in cash capability and interest expense. 
In the mean time, shareholders of the target company may be required taxation 
payments of capital gains. Another method is share swap. When ordinary 
common stock of the acquiring company is swapped, the ownership would be 
decentralised. The new issuing of common stock would probably dilute the 
DFTXLUHU¶V VKDUHSULFHZKHUHDV IRU WDUJHW ILUPV UHPDLQLQJDV VKDUHKROGHUV LQ
the acquiring firm can make the merger succeed more easily. Preferred shares 
VZDS FRXOG EH DQ DOWHUQDWLYH WR UHWDLQ WKH ELGGHU¶V RZQHUVKLS DQG SURYLGH
attractive motives for shareholders of the target company with priority over 
shareholders of common stock in the payment of dividends. Meanwhile, Brigham 
E.F. and Gapenski L.C. (1994) classify the M&A as a financial merger and 
operation merger. The acquiring and acquired companies seek lower operation 
risk which is the motive of a financial merger. Moreover, the combination of two 
companies in a related industry is expected to produce operating synergy which 
enlarges business scales and increases the market share. 
 
Since the 19th century, the world has experienced five waves of M&A, 
accompanying diverse motives. In particular, many researches discover that 
M&A often appears to have a multitude of motives rather than single one. 
Schmidt and Fowler (1990) examine the motives of M&A in terms of value and 
non-YDOXH PD[LPLVDWLRQ 9DOXH PD[LPLVDWLRQ LQFOXGHV WKH ³(IILFLHQF\ 7KHRU\´
DQG WKH ³,QIRUPDWLRQ DQG 6LJQDOOLQJ 7KHRU\´ DV ZHOO DV WKH ³0DUNHW 3RZHU
+\SRWKHVLV´1RQ-YDOXHPD[LPLVDWLRQLQFRUSRUDWHVWKH³Principle-$JHQW3UREOHP´
DQG³0DQDJHULDOLVP´WKH³&DVK)ORZ+\SRWKHVLV´DQGWKH³9DOXH5H-distribution 
7KHRU\´%ULHIGHVFULSWLRQVDUHOLVWHGLQWKHIROORZLQJSDUDJUDSKV 
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A. Value maximisation 
1. The Efficiency Theory indicates that the expected cash inflows of post M&A 
H[FHHGLQGLYLGXDOILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFH,QRWKHUZRUGV97!9$9%WKHWRWDO
market value of the combined firm generates more synergy than the individual 
market value of firm A and firm B. Three other theories are derived from this 
theory. 
 
1.1 Operating Synergy Theory 
This theory illustrates that synergy comes from the scale of economics, 
transaction cost, and management differentiated efficiency to uplift the 
production and organisation efficiency (Schmidt&Fowler,1990). 
1.1.1 Scale of Economics: A horizontal merger reduces overlapped investments, 
which enhance production efficiency by the reallocation of production resources. 
Vertical mergers can help firms decline communication costs and bargaining 
costs. Conglomerate mergers utilise complementary resources to produce 
synergy. 
1.1.2 Transactional Cost Economics: Williamson (1983) highlights that if a firm 
engages in a diversified conglomerate merger, the business operation of each 
division can be well understood and can enable managers to make efficient 
decisions in resource allocation. 
1.1.3 Efficiency of Managerial Difference: Copel and Weston (1979) clarify that a 
better performing acquirer can manage and imprRYH D WDUJHW FRPSDQ\¶V
operation efficiency. 
 
1.2 Financial Synergy Theory 
Diversification of post-M&A can produce a coinsurance effect which enables 
companies to have opportunities to lower their debt costs. Amit and Joshua 
(1988) suggest that enterprise should aim at diversification of business 
operations. Seth (1990) believes that diversified businesses can help to stabilise 
DFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZDQGKHQFHORZHUWKHRSHUDWLRQULVN+RZHYHU6DUQDWDQG
Levy (1970) explain that in a well functioning market, shareholders can diversify 
corporate risk through purchasing investment portfolio with lower cost in the 
market. Therefore, takeover would not be a better alternative to fulfil 
VKDUHKROGHU¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV /HZHOOHQ  LQVLVWV WKDW LQ D ZHOO IXQFWLRQLng 
bond market, the combination of cash flows from acquiring and acquirer firms 
18 
 
create co-LQVXUDQFH IXQFWLRQ WR ORZHU GHEWRUV¶ OLTXLGDWLRQ ULVN IRU FUHGLWRU WR
provide more capitals. 
  
1.3 Market Power Hypothesis 
Shepherd (1970) indicates that to weaken coPSHWLWRUV¶ FRPSHWHQFH DQG WR
GHFOLQH WKH QXPEHUV RI FRPSHWLWRU E\ WDNHRYHU FRXOG VWUHQJWKHQ WKH ILUP¶V
market power. Meanwhile, suppliers can obtain abnormal profits in terms of 
monopoly and oligopoly power. Singh and Montgomery (1987) examines that 
the hiJKHUPDUNHWSRZHULQFUHDVHVDILUP¶VLQIOXHQFHRQSULFLQJTXDQWLWLHVDQG
characteristics of products and then synergise the margins.  
 
1.4 Information and Signalling Theory 
The information disclosed during the process of M&A enables investors to re-
evaluDWHDFRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHDQGWKHDFTXLUHG ILUPFRXOGHQMR\ LQFUHDVHGVKDUH
price. In other words, the empirical evidence points out shareholders in the 
target company benefits at the expense of shareholders in the acquiring 
company.  
1.4.1 Kick-In-the Pants Hypothesis 
The arrival of share purchase agreements for the target company drive its 
managers to carry out more efficient operation strategies and ensure the value 
of the acquired firm.  
1.4.2 Sitting-On-A-Gold-Mine Hypothesis 
The message with regard to the WDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VXQGHUYDOXHG share price would 
EHUHOHDVHGGXULQJ0	$DFWLYLW\DQGLWHQDEOHVPDUNHWLQYHVWRU¶VWRUH-evaluate 
its share price. 
 
B. Non-Value Maximisation 
1. Principle-Agency Problem & Managerialism 
Jensen et al. (1976) suggests that managers may have different interests to run 
the business as what owners wish. Therefore, agent cost is produced to monitor 
PDQDJHU¶VDFWLYLW\DQGWRDYRLGSRWHQWLDOFRQIOLFWLQDQRUJDQLVDWLRQ 
 
1.1 Takeover reduce principle-agent problem 
Fama and Jenson (1983) claim that in case of the separation of ownership and 
management in an organisation, internal mechanisms can be adopted in order to 
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control and evaluate the decisions making process. Manne (1965) suggests that 
if managers do not perform well and cause share prices to decrease, shares of 
the company may encounter the risk of being taken over. 
 
1.2 Managerialism 
Managers pursue personal interest and decision-making policy of non-value 
PD[LPLVDWLRQZKLFKVFDULI\VKDUHKROGHUV¶EHQHILWV 
1.2.1 Growth Maximization Hypothesis 
Muller(1969) believes that rewards of managers are positive co-relation with 
scales of companies. Thus, managers prefer to expand the scale by M&A but 
potential risk of lower expected return may be ignored. 
1.2.2 Free Cash Hypothesis 
Jensen (1984) claims that if excessive cash, free cash flow, is retained in a 
company, managers probably invest in unprofitable or lower return projects, 
such as M&A activity. It is the major conflict between managers and 
shareholders in an organisation.  
1.2.3 DLYHUVLILFDWLRQRI0DQDJHPHQW¶V3HUVRQDO3RUWIROLR+\SRWKHVLV 
$PLKXG	/HYVXJJHVWWKDWPDQDJHUV¶ZRUU\DERXWORVLQJWKHLUMREVLID
firm fails to achieve business or confront the bankruptcy risk. Consequently, 
takeover activity becomes a good strategy to reduce risks of companies by 
diversification. Yet, Lewellen & Hunstsman (1970) discovered that the rewards of 
managers are highly correlated with profitability rather than company scale. 
1.2.4 Hubris Hypothesis 
Roll (1986) suggests that managers fail to evaluate favourable takeovers due to 
their overconfidence and over-optimistic attitudes, which underestimate the risks. 
As a result, the acquisitions not only generate no synergy gains but also damage 
shareholders returns. 
1.2.5 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) thinks that the major reason to carry out takeovers is because of 
the use of free cash flow leads to conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
On the other hand, this theory claims that free cash flow should be returned to 
shareholders in terms of dividends or share repurchase plans. Furthermore, 
managers should invest in projects by debt borrowing and agency costs can be 
lowered through monitoring by creditors. In other words, increase the ratio of 
debt to equity to minimise the agent problem is supported under this theory. 
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Moreover, the research of Kitching (1967) suggests that financial synergy 
performs better than production and technology synergy, followed by marketing 
synergy. Ansoff (1971) finds out that in the manufacturing industry, the synergy 
of distribution channel, sales and marketing, and technology development are 
highly generated by M&A. Weston & Mansinghka (1971) states that a 
conglomerate merger enables the company to create higher market value and 
growth rate. Hoshino (1982) indicates that in the post-M&A, the liquidity of the 
firm can be improved with decreasing profitability and ratio of debt to equity. 
Mueller (1985) discovers that acquired firms under conglomerate mergers or 
horizontal mergers, caused the market share to decline rather than increase to 
what is expected. Fowler & Schmidt (1989) implies that acquisition does not 
improve operation performance but also produces negative influence. Healy, 
Palepu and Ruback (1992) conclude that when an acquirer and a target company 
are in a related industry, the return on operating cash would be significantly 
increased. Banerjee& Eckard (1998) investigate that M&A activity enhances a 
FRPSDQ\¶V PDUNHW YDOXH E\ -18% as a result of the better operating 
efficiency rather than gains on monopoly power. 
 
2.2 Financial Valuation of M&A 
2.2.1 Defining Values 
To investigate potential value, Reilly (1990) suggests that there are 
preconditions of enterprise value which required clarification before the 
evaluation. According to Reilly, there are seven definitions of value. 
 
A. Fair Market Value 
It is an estimate of the market value of market value of a good, service, and 
assets. 
B. Fair Value 
It is identified as an unprejudiced and rational estimate of market prices of a 
property. 
C. Investment Value  
,W LVGHILQHGDV³WKHVSHFLILFYDOXHRIDQ LQYHVWPHQW WRDSDUWLFXODU LQYHVWRURU
class of investors based on individual requirements; whereas, market value is 
³WKHYDOXHRIWKHPDUNHWSODFH´DQGLWLVLPSHUVRQDO 
D. Intrinsic or Fundamental Value 
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,W VWDQGV IRU ³DQ DQDO\WLFDO MXGJHPHQW RI YDOXH EDVHG RQ WKH SHUFHLYHG
characteristics inherent in the investment, not tempered by characteristics 
peculiar to any one investor, but rather tempered by how these perceived 
characteristics ate interpreteGE\RQHDQDO\VWYHUVXVDQRWKHU´ 
E. Going ±Concern Value 
It represents value in continued use, as a going-concern business entity, and as 
a grouping of income producing assets, such as intangible assets, goodwill, and 
talented workers. 
F. Liquidation Value 
It shows value in exchange, as part of a forced liquidation; this foundation 
UHIOHFWVWKDWWKHEXVLQHVVHQWHUSULVH¶VDVVHWVZLOOEHVROGLQGLYLGXDOO\ 
G. Book Value 
This is the value of an asset shown on the balance sheet in accounting. In 
traditional term, book value of a firm is its total asset less liability and intangible 
assets. 
 
2.2.2 Approach of Business valuation 
According to Pratt S.P et. al.(2000), there are four major methods of business 
valuation. 
A. Asset-Based Approach 
This approach is develoSHGRQWKHEDVLVRIDILUP¶VDVVHWFRVW*RUGRQ96PLWK
1987; Robert Reilly, 1992).The net asset value of a target company and the 
value of equity can be evaluated by subtracting value of liability from the value 
of assets. When the M&A activity involved in the acquisition of the assets, this 
approach is the common way to estimate the value on the basis of financial 
statements. However, the limitation of intangible asset appraisal is its weakness 
and the various accounting systems probably affect results. In the meantime, 
this approach consists of book value, liquidation value, and replacement value 
elements. 
 
(A-1) Book Value Method 
7KHERRNYDOXHRIDILUPLVWKHKLVWRULFDOFRVWRIWKHILUP¶VWRWDODVVHWVOHVVWKH
recorded liability. Meanwhile, it can be DOVRFDOFXODWHGDVWKHVXPRIWKHRZQHU¶V
equity investments in the organisation plus the accumulative amount of the 
ILUP¶V UHWDLQHG HDUQLQJV+RZHYHU ERRN YDOXH GRVH QRW HTXDO HFRQRPLF YDOXH
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and the cost-based balance sheet ignores intangible assets and contingent 
liabilities. 
 
(A-2) Liquidation Value Method 
The asset value of a company equals the outcome that liquidation value of asset 
PLQXV OLTXLGDWLRQ YDOXH RI OLDELOLW\ 7KLV DSSURDFK LJQRUHV D ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\
and going-concerned value. Meanwhile, when a company is going bankruptcy or 
attempting to close business operation, this method may be implemented for 
further reference. 
 
(A-3) Replacement Value Method 
Replacement value is to estimate the cost of replacing the property to be valued 
with a similar property on the basis of existing price level. Yet, the replacement 
value of asset is not easy to be calculated accurately and it does not consider 
going±concerned value of a firm as well. Therefore, this approach could be 
applied when the target firm with replacement value of asset which greater than 
that of profitability in the merger process. 
 
B. Profitability Evaluation 
Wiese (1930) suggests that to discount expected future cash flows is the 
appropriate value of security and should be implemented LQDILUP¶VYDOXDWLRQ,W
HPSKDVLVHV WKDW D ILUP LV D ³JRLQJ-FRQFHUQ HQWLW\´2¶%U\QH  SRLQWV RXW
growth value of a company may accounts for 70% or above of its market value. 
7KHGLVDGYDQWDJHRIWKLVYDOXDWLRQLVWKHLJQRUDQFHRIDWDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VDsset 
value and results may be distorted by financial projections, whereas this 
valuation is commonly recognised as a more suited approach to assess a 
company because it takes account of profitability, growth value, and business 
risk. This valuation comprises four major methods. 
 
(B-1)Dividend Discount Valuation  
It demonstrates that the value of a share is the present value of expected 
dividends through infinity. 
Value per share of stock= σ ܧ(ܦܲܵݐ )
(1+ܭ݁)ݐ݊=λݐ=1  
Where DPSt= Expected dividends per share; Ke= Cost of equity  
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Nevertheless, to project accurate expected dividends is challenging. A dividend 
policy belongs to a man-PDGHGHFLVLRQZKLFKFRXOGQRWIXOO\UHSUHVHQWDILUP¶V
value. Furthermore, issuing dividends could not enable a promotion of a 
FRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHEHcause the company may have insufficient working capital to 
invest, therefore, barriers of the company growth is probably produced. 
 
(B-2)Accounting-Based Discount Valuation Method 
This approach substitutes dividends for net profit after taxes as the major source 
of profitability. In particular, retaining earnings remained in the company would 
create more cash flows to increase enterprise value. But accounting principles 
and rules affect results easily and the inflection is not taken into account. 
P0=σ ቀ ܺݐሺ1+ݎሻݐቁλ݅=1  
Where P0 = Payoff; Xt =net payments to equity holders;  
r = cost of equity; n=the number of period 
 
(B-3) Discount Free Cash Flow Method 
It is forward-looking and is not tied to historical accounting values. It focuses on 
cash flow rather than profits and reflects investment inflows and outflows. It 
recognises the time value of money. Meanwhile, it could evaluate intangible 
assets better than other approaches (Bruner R.F. 2004). Conversely, the 
complexity of getting detailed information to accomplish complete analysis is its 
weakness. 
P0=σ ቀ ܥܨݐሺ1+ݎሻݐቁλ݅=1  
Where P0 = Payoff; CFt =cash flow in the n period;  
r =required rate of return; n=the number of period 
 
(B-4)Adjusted Present Value Method 
To determine enterprise value, discount free cash flow at the unlevered cost of 
capital firstly and then add the present value of financing side effects, such as 
the interest tax shield, to arrive at the result. Moreover, this method can be 
implemented when the company encounters a change in its capital structure.  
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C. Market Comparative Appraisal Approach  
According to market efficiency theory, in the long run, market value could be the 
most valuable signal which reflects a real value of a company. This valuation of a 
target company in the M&A involves finding out similar companies that are 
comparable to the acquired firms and then to compare their financial 
performance and associating linkage of market value. When the comparator and 
the target firm perform similar features in business operation and explore 
potential rLVNV LQ WKH IXWXUH WKH HVWLPDWLRQRI WKH ILUP¶VYDOXHZRXOGEHPRUH
reliable. The analysis includes various multipliers, such as price/earnings, 
price/book value, and price/cash flow.  
VI =
ܸ݂
 × F 
Where VI = the value of the target firm; 
ܸ݂
 = market multiplier of the similar 
company; F = financial variables of the target enterprise 
 
(C-1)Price/Earnings Ratios: This calculation is an easy and common way to 
UHIOHFWDILUP¶VVWDWXVLQWKHEXVLQHVVPDUNHW3(ULVHVZKHQDILUPLVH[SHFWHG 
to have good prospect, and vice versa. Yet, projection with errors could cause 
the share price evaluated inaccurately. Meanwhile, it is meaningless when the 
EPS of a company is negative and the accounting rules are varied. On the other 
hand, this model has positive interrelation with the dividend issuing ratio. 
 
(C-2)Price/Book Value Ratios: This model can be adapted when a firm performs 
negative profits and it provides relatively stable tool to be compared with market 
price. On the country, book value is influenced easily by depreciation and an 
enterprise could manipulate ROE to raise this ratio which mislead investors in 
the market. Moreover, book value of equity would be negative probably if the 
firm remains a loss profit in the long run. 
 
(C-3)Price/Sales Ratios: Sales is not tied to the accounting rules, and this ratio 
possesses smaller variation than prior two ratios. Besides, it can be employed by 
a firm that encounter difficulties; thus, this ratio is relatively reliable. However, if 
a firm has the problem of cost control which could not be sort out by this ratio, 
the valuation may be misguided as well. 
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D. Real-Options-Based Evaluation 
Shareholders have residual rights over the cash flows of the company after the 
enterprise value is deducted by existing rights of creditors in debt contracts. 
Therefore, the nature of equity and debt in an option pricing mechanism is worth 
to be considered. Shareholder equity could be viewed as a call option and the 
shareholders are the holders of call options, which are under the condition that 
the value of the call option is defined by market value; subsequently, if the 
enterprise value does not exceed the exercise price of a call option, the 
shareholders will not exercise the option, because shareholders do not get any 
payoff. In contrast, when the enterprise value exceeds the borrowing cost 
including paying the interest and repaying the debt, the option will be exercised 
by shareholders and the shareholders obtain the payoff that the borrowing cost 
is removed from enterprise value. The major advantage of this valuation is 
capturing the managerial flexibility of a project that may be ignored by 
traditional NPV analysis. It helps decision maker to consider whether or not to 
invest in a new project at present or in the near future, or to contract, expand, 
or give up an ongoing investment. In other words, managers could be capable of 
adjusting their investment project under various market situations to further 
pursue profit maximisation for their organisations. Black±Scholes (1973) 
suggests the following model to value share price. 
S=V × ܰሺ݀1ሻ െ ܤ × ܰ(݀2) × ݁െܴ݂ܶ 
 
2.2.3 Valuation Process of Business 
Copeland, Koller, and Murrin(1994) suggest five steps required. 
A. Analyse historical performance   
(A-1) Calculate NOPLAT and capital investment 
(A-2) Work out value drivers 
(A-3)Build-up a historical prospect as a whole 
(A-4)Analyse fundamental finance structure 
B. Project free cash flow 
(B-1)Differentiate sources of FCF 
(B-2)Develop scenarios of performance 
(B-3)Decide assumptions of forecast 
(B-4)Examine rationality of the prediction 
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C. Estimate cost of capital 
(C-1)Decide the weight of value of the target 
(C-2)Calculate cost of capital of non-equity securities 
(C-3)Calculate cost of capital of equity securities 
D. Approximate going-concern value 
(D-1)Choose adequate instrument 
(D-2)Decide forecast periods  
(D-3)Calculate parameters and prioritise their importance 
(D-4)Discount the value 
E. Work out the outcome and give explanation 
(E-1) Calculate and examine the result 
(E-2) Based on the result to clarify the implications 
 
In the last two decades, the discount cash flow approach is the most popular 
valuation in the share price of the target company. Yet, in the study of Caugh & 
Meador (1984), it indicates that the variables of prospect of the industry, 
expected EPS, and economic environment, and are the most important signals to 
evaluate short-term of share prices. In the long-run, expected EPS, expected 
return on equity, and prospect of the industry are crucial accesses to more 
accurate analysis. Lippitt & Astracchio (1993) conclude that the discounted cash 
flow (DCF) method and earning capital model are suitable for small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs).The earning capital model is based on historical data to 
project future earnings and it appears lower uncertainty compared to the DCF 
approach. As Pratt (1989) states the results can be equivalent to the present 
value of future earnings by adjustment of past earning records, such as inflation, 
depreciation, and replacement assets. 
 
On the other hand, according to the research of Hickman & Perty (1990), while 
the target firm is not a publicly trading business, Market Multiple and Dividend 
Discount methods are appropriate for the valuation. In particular, Price/EPS 
helps predict more accurate share price than Dividend Discount analysis due to 
the errors in discount rate that is estimated by CAPM formula. A study by Guatri 
L.(1994) shows that market value of equity is differ from book value in three 
aspects. Firstly, the performance of financial activities, sales and marketing 
management, and innovative capability in research and development are 
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REVHUYHG IURP VKDUHKROGHUV¶ HTXLW\ RQ WKH EDODQFH VKHHW RI D FRPSDQ\ ,Q
addition, in pursuit of shareholder value maximisation is a fundamental objective 
of the organisation. In other words, to optimize the market value of equity in 
terms of the net income that a firm produces is what investors concern. 
 
$OWKRXJKYDULHGILQDQFLDOHYDOXDWLRQDSSURDFKHVHQDEOHWKHDFTXLUHUV¶DFFHVVWR
relatively reliable value of target companies, the high uncertainty and risk still 
cause over half of underperformance or failed rate of M&A activities in the 
historical records. Moreover, Table 2 reveals the announcement period of 
abnormal return in 1980s and 1990s.It is obvious WKDWWKHDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHSULFH
shows a decreasing trend after the takeover is announced, but acquired 
companies are in a reversed pattern which increases in its value. In other words, 
the investors in the market show low confidence to acquirers relating to the 
creation of additional value by acquisition. 
  
Table2.  Announcement Period Cumulative Abnormal Return by Decade 
 
  1980-89 1990-99 
Target     
[-1,+1] 16.0% 15.9% 
[-20,close] 23.9% 23.3% 
Acquirer     
[-1,+1] -0.4% -1.0% 
[-20,close] -3.1% -3.9% 
Resource: Andrade G., Mitchell M., and Stafford E.  "New Evidence and Perspectives 
in Mergers" 
Journal of Economic: Perspectives, Vol.15, No.2, Spring 2001, pp.103-120. 
 
Goold and Campbell (1999) also suggest that the four main reasons which cause 
the failures of M&A are: the overestimations of synergies, the confidence that 
synergy can be emerged by strengthening cooperation, underestimation of the 
difficulties in resource integration, as well as the ignorance of risky probability in 
synergic production. Haspeslaugh and Jemison (1991) classify activities of M&A 
as four theories which are illustrated as follows. 
 
1. Capital Market Theory 
This theory believes that M&A can create wealth for shareholders and social 
economy. CAPM, Cash Flow, Efficiency Market, and Agent theories are embodied; 
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while, they provide limited explanation relating to the underperformance of M&A 
activities in the world. 
2. Strategic Management Theory 
It centres on how to generate synergy and reduce conflicts in an organisation by 
fitting in adjusted strategy after the acquisitions. Fowler and Schmidt (1989) and 
Kitching (1967) think that market share and market scale are the most possible 
factors driving the outstanding post-M&A performance. 
3. Organisation Behaviour Theory 
This theory focuses on the implementation of efficient management which deals 
with risk, human resource and cultural aspects. In particular, Jenson (1998) and 
Nahavandi and Malekazadeh (1988) examine the cultural differences between 
two organisations which may enable the managerial barriers to become enlarged, 
whereas the successful cultural integration and the efficient interaction of 
individual strengths within the firm in the post-acquisition that brings positive 
changes of behaviours are dramatically important. 
4. Procedure Theory 
This concept integrates theories of strategic management and organisational 
behaviours. It not only reveals the possible factors which affect the results of 
acquisitions from the viewpoints of procedure but also provides how the final 
outcome of takeover is caused by the process of strategic decision-making and 
integration. Therefore, the efficiently managerial capabilities drive the potentials 
of synergic creations in post-M&A (Greenwood et al.1994). 
 
2.3 Brand Strategy of M&A 
 
With the development of the global market, brand marketing has become an 
unavoidable trend to drive higher market share of products and service. 
Therefore, building up a global strong brand is the most powerful weapon to 
create a new market. Doyle (1990) highlights that there are two methods for a 
company to create its brand name; one is building brands and another is buying 
brands. When an enterprise with strong marketing competence and research 
FDSDELOLW\ LQDVLJQLILFDQWO\JURZLQJPDUNHWDGRSWVD³EXLOGLQJEUDQG´ strategy, 
this is a good opportunity to foster its branding. However, if a firm does not 
have advantages in marketing and technological innovation, to acquire a brand 
by relatively lower costs as an alternative. 
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Brand formation is a long-term process with the accumulation of experience, 
knowledge, and competitive resources. The completed international marketing 
strategy and practical operation with good quality and specific features of 
products require expensive marketing expenditures. It may become a compDQ\¶V
financial burden. Through M&A activity, a firm can shorten its learning curve 
whilst building a brand and obtain an existing market share of a target company. 
Furthermore, Aaker and Joachimsthaler (2002) mentioned that acquiring brand, 
acquired brand, and co-brand are three patterns of brands. In particular, 
consumers in developed countries have higher confidence and preference in their 
domestic brand. Under this condition, if the target company is located in 
developed countries, implementing strategies of acquired brand or co-branding, 
will create influential power. 
 
Biel (1992) argues that brand equity can be viewed as the excessive cash flow, 
which is generated after products and services are combined with branding. 
Simon and Sullivan (1993) suggest that brand equity should be defined as the 
difference of cash flows between products with brands and non-branded 
products. Brasco (1988) concludes that brand equity is the total present value of 
current and future earnings and the brand value should be considered as the 
LQWDQJLEOHDVVHWRIDFRPSDQ\¶VILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQW2QWKHRWKHUhand, Stobert 
(1989) thinks that brand equity is a replacement cost. Brasco and Stobart (1988) 
define it as liquidation value or synergy which should be taken into account for 
M&A evaluation. The Marketing Science Institute brand equity is the additional 
value of a brand name, and it enables companies to obtain more market share 
and better profitability. Meanwhile, brand equity is a set of customers, channels, 
and an awareness of branding advantages. 
 
2.4 Cultural Difference of M&A 
Hofstede (1994) identifies national cultural differences to five dimensions (see 
Table 3). 
1. Power distance 
It is the level which individuals with less power in organisations or institutions 
accept and desire that the power can be released unequally. 
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2. Individualism vs. Collectivism 
It is the degree to which members are willing to be incorporated in the same 
groups and pursue success of a team rather than individual achievement. 
3. Masculinity vs. Femininity 
It indicates the distribution of roles between sexes which is expected to be 
performed in terms of conventional viewpoints. 
4. Uncertainty Avoidance 
This implicates the tolerance of a society toward uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
failure. Besides, it is the extent to which an individual pursues the truth and 
rejects the unstructured conditions. 
5. Long Term vs. Short Term Orientation 
It stresses the pursuit of a virtue rather than the truth. Values of long term 
orientation are thrift and perseverance. Values of short term orientation are 
JLYLQJ³IDFH´WRVRPHRQHIXOILOOLQJVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDQGUHVSHFWLQJWUDGLWLRQ 
 
In this study, theories of capital market and organisation behaviour, in particular, 
the cultural issues in the cross broad M&A are stressed in terms of a case 
research. Consequently, it involves not only the financial valuation that helps 
firms to evaluate future cash flow and potential financial benefits from branding 
equity and marketing expansion, but also the integration of national culture, 
which accounts for fundamental factors to affect related decision-making 
processes and strategic management. Not all of the risks and problems would be 
expected to be discovered before the takeover, therefore careful examinations in 
possible conditions and solutions should be considered and an attempt should be 
made to find out the correlation between managerial capability and synergy 
desired after the M&A activities. Finally, the success rate of a M&A may be 
improved with higher returns that than what are expected. 
 
Table 3: Five Dimensions of National Culture Difference (Hofstede, 1994) 
Dimensions Small Power Distance 
Societies 
Large Power Distance Societies 
PDI Hierarchy means an inequality 
of roles, established for 
convenience 
Subordinates expect to be 
consulted 
Ideal Boss is resourceful 
Hierarchy means existential 
inequity 
Subordinates expect to be told 
what to do 
Ideal boss is benevolent autocrat 
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democrat 
 Collectivist Societies Individualist Societies 
Individualism 
vs. 
Collectivism 
Value standards differ for in-
group and out-group: 
particularism 
Other people are seen as 
members of their group 
Relationship prevails over 
task 
Moral model of employer-
employee relationship 
Same value standards apply to 
all: universalism 
Other people seen as potential 
resources 
Task prevails over relationship 
Calculative model of employer-
employee relationship 
 
 Feminine Societies Masculine Societies 
Masculinity  
vs. 
Femininity 
Assertiveness ridiculed 
Undersell yourself 
Stress on life quality 
Intuition 
Assertiveness appreciated 
Oversell yourself 
Stress on careers 
Decisiveness 
 Weak uncertainty avoidance 
societies 
Strong uncertainty avoidance 
societies 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Dislike of rules- written or 
unwritten 
Less formulisation and 
standardisation 
Emotional need for rules-written 
and unwritten 
More formulisation and 
standardisation 
 Long-term orientation Short-term orientation 
Long term 
vs. short 
term 
orientation  
Value of thrift and 
perseverance 
Value of the respect for tradition 
Fulfilling social obligation 
3URWHFWLQJRQH¶V³IDFH´ 
 
3. M&A Case Study of BenQ and Siemens Mobile Division 
3.1 Background of Handset Market  
According to the research of Wireless Device Strategies (WDS) service, the 
potential demand of global mobile phone market is expected to grow from 772 
million in 2005 to 1,129 million handsets in 2010.The global sales of mobile 
phones would expand with average growth rate of 8% year-on-year, but the 
wholesale average selling price (ASP) is predicted to decline 11% each year. The 
intHQVLYH SULFH FRPSHWLWLRQ ORZHUV VXSSOLHUV¶ SURILWV 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG
expensive research and development expenditures in either low-cost cellular 
SKRQH RU KLJKO\ LQWHJUDWHG KDQGVHWV LQFUHDVH VXSSOLHUV¶ RSHUDWLRQ ULVN LQ WKH
following years. 3G and WCDMA devices with multi-gigabyte memories, stereo 
sound, VHS resolution video and WLAN functions become the major trend. In the 
near future, those multimedia handsets called smartphones with an open 
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operating system which can download related applications, such as advanced 
imaging, web browsing, music, and email onto the device and run for it. 
Moreover, as the cost of memory and processing power continue to decrease, it 
is strongly believed that smartphones will drives the glowing demand and even 
low cost phones would be added simple applications. Consequently, smartphones 
which belong to a niche high-end market in 2005 would no longer exist in the 
following years. It is the reason why holding high-end technology not only in 
software service but attractive hardware device is the key to win the market and 
to threaten competitors and new entrants. IDC survey shows that although the 
global shipments of smartphones merely reveal 5%, the prediction in 2010 and 
thereafter will over 15%.  
 
According to an investigation by IDC and ITU, in the global market Asia with the 
largest population and strong demand in the world has become the most 
powerful market in either growth rate or potential size. In particular, China and 
India account for 30% and 60% respectively by forecast of shipments growth in 
2006. Likewise, the mobile phone market in the Middle East and Africa has 
expended rapidly; North America complying with 17% growth rate, whilst 
:HVWHUQ (XURSH¶V UHPDLQLQJ SRWHQWLDO LQ  LVPDLQO\ GULYHQ E\ the  
replacement market.  
 
Table 3 illustrates key players in handset market. Nokia was well positioned to 
gain the largest market share and continues to remain in its advantages to be 
the first mover in product development; Motorola has valuable brand equity in 
North America which in favour of its introduction of new products and market 
share maintenance. Samsung has obtained stable and growing market share in 
the recent years and it focuses on the strategy of launching smart phones, which 
will probably change the future marNHW¶VG\QDPLFV0RUHRYHU/*HQMR\HGJRRG
growth rate following closely on after Siemens by merely a slight difference.   
 
Table 4: Worldwide Market Share of Major Handset Suppliers 
Company 2004 Sales 2004 (%) 
Market 
Share  
2005 Sales 2005 (%) 
Market 
Share 
Nokia 207,231 30.7 265,615 32.5 
Motorola 104,124 15.4 144,920 17.7 
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Samsung 85,238 12.6 54,924 12.8 
Siemens 48,455 7.2 54,710 6.7 
LG 42,277 6.3 51,774 6.3 
Sony 
Ericsson 
42,031 6.2 28,580 3.5 
Others 144,644 21.6 166,985 20.5 
Total 674,000 100 816,563 100 
Source: http://gsmserver.com/articles/mobile_sales_in_2005.php 
 
3.2 Introduction to case  
 
Siemens AG, the largest electronic and engineering conglomerate in Europe, 
consists of six major business areas with 15 business units, which generated 
¼ PLOOLRQ UHYHQXH LQ  6LHPHQV KDV DOUHDG\ SURGXFHG KLJK-end 
quality mobile phones VLQFH WKH¶V+RZHYHU WKH ILHUFHO\ FRPSHWLWLYHDQG
highly innovative handset industry drove new players to step forward and any 
careless delays on the part of the linchpin may result in unavoidable profit loss. 
The handset business contributes to DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ¼ PLOOLRQ  RI
Siemens AG revenue in total (Siemens AG Annual Report, 2004). In contrast, 
the mobile device division continuously posted sales losses, IURP¼PLOOLRQLQ
WR¼PLOOLRQLQWKHILUVWTXDUWHURI7KLVSUHGLFDPHQWIRUFHG.ODXV
Kleinfeld, the CEO of Siemens, to carry out the organisational reconstructing 
plan, which included looking for a buyer to take over the mobile device business 
(Canibol H.P. 2006). 
 
BenQ, a Taiwanese electronics and computer peripherals manufacturer with 
approximate DQQXDOVDOHVRI¼,064 million, is a major original equipment/design 
manufacturer (OEM/ODM) for global brand customers, such as Motorola and 
Nokia. It is headquartered in Taipei with factories in China, Taiwan, Brazil, and 
the Czech Republic, and with over 15,000 employees in the world. BenQ has five 
main business units, including a Display& Imaging Business Group (DIG), 
Networking & Communications Business Group (NCG), Digital Media Business 
*URXS '0* DQG 6WRUDJH %XVLQHVV 8QLW 6%8 ,Q SDUWLFXODU ',* LV %HQ4¶V
core business, focusing on LDC monitors and generating 45% of overall revenue, 
IROORZHG E\ 6%8  1&*  DQG '0*  1&*¶V PDMRU EXVLQHVV LV
PRELOH GHYLFHV VDOHV DOWKRXJK LWV UHYHQXH KDG UHDFKHG ¼ PLOOLRQ ZLWK
increasing shipment of 15.5 million units, in 2004, the majority of those 
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shipments are not sold unGHU WKH ³%(14´ EUDQG QDPH (Qisda Annual Report, 
2004). BenQ realised that failing to foster strong brand awareness among the 
market and consumers would restrict its business scenarios and scopes and 
hinder diversified developments. Besides, with an absence of the accumulation 
of customer loyalty due to the brand awareness, the company would be easily 
stuck in a dilemma relating to new customer creation or relationship 
maintenance of second-buy consumers. In the mean time, with no well-
established mutual interaction with the market and consumers, the company 
may be insensitive to the fast-changing tempo in product innovation. This is 
EHOLHYHGWREHWKHPDMRUFRQFHUQIRU%HQ4¶VEXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQ   
 
:KLOHWKHEUDQGµ%HQ4¶ZDVHYDOXDWHGDVone of the top five brands in Taiwan, 
the value was is estimated to be worth ¼PLOOLRQZKLFKZDVIDUEHKLQGRWKHU
global brands, such as Samsung. The brand value of Samsung was 40 times that 
RI%HQ4¶VLQ%HQ4ZDVDPELWLRXVin expanding its business and to build up 
a valuable brand, although its mobile phones sold under the µ%HQ4¶brand merely 
accounted for the minority of its overall shipments. However, the lack of a 
potential global demand market to underpin its value creation resulted in 
difficulties in extending %HQ4¶V JOREDOPDUNHWLQJ FRYHUDJH Consequently, M&A 
turned out to be the most efficient and fastest alternative to strengthen %HQ4¶V
global platform (Invest in Taiwan, 2005). 
 
3.3 The Failure of BenQ acquiring Siemens Handset Business 
 
,Q2FWREHU%HQ4DFTXLUHG6LHPHQV¶V ORVV-making mobile device division 
and became the 6th largest handset marker in the world. Meanwhile, the revenue 
generation by mobile phone outputs would be raised from the original 16% to 
over 60% in BenQ. With this acquisition, the mobile device division is renamed 
as BenQ Mobile, which includes R&D design centres in Germany, Denmark, and 
China as well as manufacturing factories in Germany and Brazil. According to the 
acquisition agreement, BenQ Mobile obtains the right to sell the Siemens brand 
handset for 18 months and co-branded mobile phones (BenQ-Siemens) for five 
years. Moreover, Siemens would offer 250 million in cash to compensate BenQ 
with over a thousand patents granted as well; it looked like a good free deal to 
BenQ. On the other hand, the formal announcement of this acquisition caused 
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%HQ4¶V VKDUH SULFH GHFOLQH RYHU  RQ WKH VXEVHTXHQW GD\ DW WKH 7DLZDQ
Stock Exchange Market, while the increased share price of Siemens by over 
 UHIOHFWHG LQYHVWRUV¶ UHYHUVHG H[SHFWDWLRQV WRZDUG WKLV HYHQW 7KLV
SKHQRPHQRQDFFRUGVZLWKWKH³LQIRUPDWLRQDQGVLJQDOOLQJWKHRU\´PHQWLRQHG LQ
the earlier session (The Financial Express, 2005). 
 
Unfortunately, in September 2006, BenQ Mobile filed for bankruptcy protection 
DIWHU LW VXIIHUHG D KXJH ORVV RI DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ¼ PLOOLRQ ZLWKin one year 
(Wearden G., 2007). Although this action directly caused 3,000 German 
employees to lose their jobs, BenQ, the parent company, had no choice but to 
stop the money loss which probably endanger its existing operations. On the 
other hand, although better profitability was gained and it was reflected on the 
increasing share price after Siemens AG carried out its restructuring programme, 
the development of mobile phone and periphery industries in Germany faced the 
breakdown. Why was the outcome beyond all expectations? Was it a definite 
wrong decision for BenQ to acquire Siemens¶V mobile division? Or Should 
Siemens insist on the sale of its mobile division in the beginning (Canibol H.P., 
2006)? 
 
There were lots of reasons attributed for the failure of this merger. First of all, 
%HQ4¶V KXJH ORVV RI DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ¼ PLOOLRQ LQ WKLV DFTXLVLWLRQ DOUHDG\
VXUSDVVHGLWVVKDUHFDSLWDOZKLFKZDVPHUHO\¼PLOOLRQ0HDQZKLOHDVKDUS
LQFUHDVHLQGHEW¼PLOOLRQDOUHDG\UHGXFHG%HQ4¶VERRNYDOXHSHUVKDUHWR
NTD14. According to Taiwan Securities and Exchange law, if book value per 
share of a company lowers than NTD10, margin trading and securities lending of 
the firm in the open market would not be allowed. Therefore, to keep book value 
SHU VKDUH RYHU 17' EHFDPH %HQ4¶V SULRULW\ RWKHUZLVH, it will also offer 
FRPSHWLWRUVDJRRGRSSRUWXQLW\WRODUJHO\DFTXLUH%HQ4¶VVKDUHVZLWKORZSULFH
and further dominate this firm and its subsidiaries. In addition, it is crucial that 
the acquirer operates healthy financial operation before the merger is 
implemented; in particular, the acquiring firm is smaller than the target 
FRPSDQ\ %HQ4¶V VDOHV DOUHDG\ DSSHDUHGVOLJKWO\ ORVV LQ WKH ODVW WZR TXDUWHUV
prior to the acquisition; meanwhile, BenQ had to report a tremendous loss 
DURXQG ¼PLOOLRQ TXDUWHUO\ from Siemens Mobile Division after the merger. 
Both unhealthy business and financial conditions strongly weaken the probability 
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of success of this acquisition. Next, many financial figures of BenQ Mobile 
predicted in this merger, was based on the market share that would be remained 
the same as year 2005, approximately 5.2%. However, the market share of 
Siemens mobile business faced sharply decrease from 5.5% in 2005 to 4.5% in 
2006 after Siemens handset business was integrated with BenQ. Two main 
factors that were considered cause the loss of market share. One reason was 
WKDW%HQ4RYHUHVWLPDWHG6LHPHQV¶V LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\RI*60*356DQG*
in the mobile communication field could shorten product development schedule 
and enhance product functions, because there were merely 7-8 items of 
thousands patents obtained in this acquisition useful. In reality, Siemens was not 
well developed in 3G and multimedia mobile handsets as a result of weak 
software technology and it was a low-price rather than a high-end mobile phone 
SURYLGHU LQ (XURSHDQ PDUNHW )XUWKHUPRUH 6LHPHQV¶V IUDJLOH VHQVLWLYLW\ RI
consumer market also reflects on its delayed product innovation. This 
SKHQRPHQRQVRDUHG%HQ40RELOH¶VUHVHDUFKH[SHQVHVLJQLILFDQWO\DQGGHVWDELOLVH
its finance. Finally, culture difference undermined managerial efficiency and 
slowed down restructuring plan during integration period. Besides, BenQ was 
over-confident that their successful business experience in computer market 
development could help their market extension in mobile phone market, 
although BenQ was less familiar with mobile phone field in operation mode and 
managerial strategy; but challenging market condition and strong intervention of 
6LHPHQV ODERXU XQLRQ LQ LQWHJUDWLRQ SURJUHVV DIIHFWHG %HQ4¶V FRVW-saving and 
expenditure-cutting in the financial burden. 
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4. Findings  
 
4.1 Valuing Siemens Mobile Division Applying DCF Analysis with WACC 
Due to the restricted information with regard to the financial data of mobile 
division in and prior to 2004 annual report of Siemens AG, the DCF analysis will 
depends on the financial statements that are built on the basis of existing figures 
with numerous assumptions and conditions to arrive at the final result. Table 6 
details the analysis of the DCF evaluation of business value of Siemens Mobile 
'LYLVLRQKHUHDIWHUµ60'¶ZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHGLYLVLRQ¶VRSHUDWLRQLVD
µJRLQJ FRQFHUQ HQWLW\¶ LQ WKH IXWXUH 7KLV DQDO\VLV LV GLYLGHG E\ WKUHH VWHSV 
(Brealey R.H. et al., 2006). 
 
Step1: estimate the timing and amount of expected cash flows. Panel A and B of 
Table 6 shows the pro forma financial statements and cash flow forecasts for 
SMD which is demanded to accomplish Step 1 of the DCF analysis (Titman S. 
and Martin J.D., 2008). Because the effective date of this acquisition by BenQ 
was on October 1, 2005, the expected incremental operating cash flow 
projections comprise planning period from 2006 to 2010 and terminal value 
which is based on the cash flow for 2011 and afterward. Terminal value is an 
estimate that encompassed any possible financial value in terminal period and it 
can be viewed as perpetuity. Moreover, the figures of Panel A are created by the 
assumptions described as follows. 
ł7KH UHYHQXH IRUHFDVW see Panel 6-A) reflects an assumed rate that BenQ 
Siemens could remain its market share after the merger at 5.5% between 2006 
and 2007 and then followed by the increasing market share, 6.5%, from 2007 to 
2008, then followed by 7% in the following periods. Average selling price (ASP) 
RIKDQGVHWV LVNHSWXQFKDQJHGDW¼0HDQZKLOH WKHVHILJXUHVDUHEDVHG
on the 5.8% average growth rate in the worldwide market that is showed in 
2005 annual report of BenQ (see Table 5). 
ł7KHDYHUDJH production cost of Siemens pre-DFTXLVLWLRQLV¼SHUKDQGVHWDQG
the cost of goods sold is assumed from 97% of ASP in 2006 to 95% of ASP in 
2009 and 2010 gradually.  
ł%HQ4 SODQV WR GHFOLQH PDWHULDO FRVWV RI 60' E\  DQG WKLV DFWLYLW\ LV
expected to be achieved by 2008. 
ł7KHH[SHQVHRIUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQWDFFRXQWV for 4% of revenue. 
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ł0DUNHWLQJH[SHQGLWXUHDQGDIWHU-sales service expense, over ¼ million, is the 
majority of selling, general, and administrative expense of SMD before the 
acquisition. BenQ Mobile intends to strengthen the cost saving on this portion in 
the following years. 
ł7D[EHQHILWVDUHDVVXPHG WREHQLOZKHQ WKH LQFRPH ORVV FRPHVRXWDQG WD[  
rate is supposed to be in line with the standard rate of corporate tax in Taiwan, 
which is 25%. 
In addition, the asset level listed in the pro forma balance sheets in Panel B 
reveals the assets that BenQ Mobile has to support the predicted sales.  The 
assumptions and conditions which build up the balance sheet are described as 
follows. 
ł7KH Easic pro-acquisition balance sheet of the mobile division is founded on 
Siemens 2005 annual report P.155 and 156. 
ł7KHVWUDLJKWOLQHGHSUHFLDWLRQPHWKRGLVDGRSWHGDQGWKHXVHIXOOLIHRISURSHUW\
plant, and equipment are assumed to be a five-year term without scrap value. 
ł6LHPHQV $* UHFRJQLVHG WKH ¼ PLOOLRQ H[LW UHODWHG FKDUJH DQG WKDW WKH
commission of investment bank is included (Siemens 2005 annual report, 
P.155).Therefore, this charge would be ignored in BenQ Mobile financing 
calculation.  
ł%HQ4SOans to turnaround BenQ Mobile business from sales loss to profitability 
LQ WZR \HDUV WKHUHIRUH WKH FDSLWDO RI DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ¼ PLOOLRQ ZLWK
assumption of 47.36% in bank loan and 46.36% in equity for its mobile 
subsidiary business to restructure. TherefoUH %HQ4¶V GHEW LQFUHDVHV IURP WKH
RULJLQDOOHYHORI¼PLOOLRQXSWR¼PLOOLRQ2Q7DLZDQVWRFNPDUNHWVKDUH
SULFH RI 6HSWHPEHU   WKH PDUNHW FDSLWDOLVDWLRQ RI %HQ4¶V HTXLW\ ZDV
¼PLOOLRQDIWHU WKHPHUJHU&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHFDSLWDOVWUXFture weights of 
BenQ are 50.46% debt and 49.54% equity in market value. 
ł0RUHRYHU 6LHPHQV$*ZRXOG SURYLGH ¼PLOOLRQ FDVK DQG VHUYLFHZKLFK LV
supposed to be released in 2005 and 2006.  
ł,QWDQJLEOHDVVHWVRI%HQ40RELOHFRPSULVLQJEUDQGQDPHJRRGZLOO and patents 
are presupposed to be 6% of Siemens 2005 intangible assets which is aligned 
with the percentage of mobile division revenue to Siemens consolidated sales.     
ł7KHFXUUHQWDVVHWLQLVVXSSRVHGWREHRIVDOHVDQGLWVIXWXUHYDOXHRI
inventory and account receivables are also projected with sales growth at the 
same rate. 
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ł7KHFXUUHQWOLDELOLW\LVDVVXPHGWREHRIDQQXDOVDOHVSURMHFWLRQV 
 
Step 2: estimate the risk discount rate. The CAPM formula is suitable here to 
generate required return and then put it into WACC formula which produces risk 
discount rate, the return that BenQ expect to earn by the investment finally. 
)LUVWRIDOOULVNIUHHUDWHLVDVVXPHGWREHWKHLQWHUHVWUDWHRI7DLZDQ%DQN¶VRQH
year fixed deposit, 2%. Market expected return is assumed to be the return on 
average weighted price index of Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1996 and 2007, 
9.37%(Bloomberg,2007/12/31).The Bata value, 1.5, is taken from a mobile 
phone competitor-Motorola as a comparator to evaluate the beta value of 
Siemens mobile division and it comes from the equity coefficient unlevered to 
JHWDEHWDHVWLPDWH XZLWK UHPRYLQJ0RWRUROD¶VSDUWLFXODUFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH
Although Motorola and Siemens are in the same handset industry with similar 
business risk, their capital structures are varied which influences beta 
FRHIILFLHQWV)XUWKHUPRUHWRUHIOHFW%HQ4¶VGHWHTXLW\FDSLWDOLVDWLRQUDWLRDQGWKH
corporate tax rate by re-levering the unlevered equity beta (ßd) is required, and 
then a levered beta estimate (ßd) of the BenQ Mobile is produced. The last step, 
WACC, helps to arrive on to the discount rate (Titman S. and Martin J.D., 2008). 
 
ßu formula = ßd/[1+(1-t)Debt/Equity] 
ßu = 1.5/[1+(1-0.25)25.5%/74.5%]=1.19 
BenQ Mobile ßd=1.19*[1+(1-0.25)*1.0185]=2.099 
CAPM formula: E(ri)= rf+ ßi[E(Rm)-rf] 
E(ri)=2%+2.099[9.37%-2%]=17.47% 
WACC formula: Ke* We + Kd(1-t)*Wd 
WACC=17.47%*49.54%+5% (1-0.25)*50.46%=10.55% 
* ßu stands for Beta value without debt 
   ßd represents Beta value with debt 
 
Moreover, the accomplishment of cash flows during the five year period (see 
Table 6-B) LVIROORZHGE\WHUPLQDOYDOXHH[SHFWDWLRQ7KHµ*RUGRQ*URZWK0RGHO¶
is implemented here to calculate the present value of free cash flow which 
begins in 2011 and continues infinitely. Suppose the cash flow for the year 2011 
and thereafter will grow at a constant rate, 5%, and then annually in perpetuity. 
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Moreover, the cash flow is assumed to be produced after the end of each 
planning period (Titman S. and Martin J.D., 2008).                  
 
Terminal value = FCF2010*[(1+growth rate) / (Cost of capital ± growth rate)] 
                      = FCF2010*Gordon Growth Model Multiple 
BenQ Mobile Terminal value =60.4(1+5%) / (10.55%-5%) =1143 
 
Step 3: work out the present value of the Siemens Mobile Device business 
(renamed as BenQ Mobile after the acquisition).Table 6-C shows that Siemens 
Mobile Division value which employs free cash flow valuation and then discounts 
it by cost of capital (WACC), 10.55%. Based on the DCF analysis, this acquisition 
is a positive-NPV investment, 137 million euro. The result seems to show an 
attractive business by NPV which could be expected in the future. However, the 
required injection of 760 million euro capital by BenQ will still make this 
takeover a loss business by 623 million euro. 
 
Moreover, to evaluate merely the cash flows that is showed on Panel 6-C may 
not be sufficient to cover the market changes because many assumptions which 
contributed this outcome are based on the varied constant rate to project the 
demand. There are many uncertainties in the dynamic market, which may 
GLVWRUW WKH RULJLQDO HYDOXDWLRQ LQ FDVK IORZ SURMHFWLRQ 7KHUHIRUH DV %HQ4¶V
managers, to consider some possible variations in projected revenue which helps 
company to develop vary feasible operating strategies during the decision-
making process of acquisition is demanded. This activity would be necessary to 
enable the firm generate more considerations for potential risks declining when 
the investment is implemented. 
 
To arrive at this purpose, µSensitivity Analysis¶ could be performed as a tool to 
evaluate key drivers that cause influences on the cash flows and help company 
to find out possible variables in specific industry. There should be three 
important value drivers with regards to the Siemens Mobile Division acquisition. 
These drives are investigated here and then compared with the real situation of 
%HQ4¶VDFTXLVLWLRQFirst one is the estimated sales growth rate in the cash flows 
of Siemens Mobile business. The terminal value, another key driver, depends on 
the end of planning period cash flows that is calculated associating with post-
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planning period returns. Moreover, the cost of capital plays a crucial role in cash 
flows amount as well (Titman S. and Martin J.D., 2008, P.290). 
 
1. Sensitivity Analysis - Sales Growth Rate 
In Table 5, the revenue forecast is built by the increasing market share 
projection of BenQ Siemens, from 5.2% to 6% during the periods to estimate 
the sales growth along with unchanged selling price assumption. However, when 
the firm faces fierce competitive business environment, to keep selling price 
fixed could decrease market share rather than remain market share in the same 
pace of global growth. Furthermore, to steadily reduce the COGS from 97% to 
95% of the selling price in the projected periods also shows an unrealistic way. 
If a firm could not implement efficient managerial strategy, the cost of goods 
sold could account for the higher percentage to the sales, which might erodes 
profits; therefore, these assumptions are still optimistic, and cause positive NPV 
which probably misguide the evaluation result, then result in investment loss; in 
particular, if the decision marker believe that their managerial ability is capable 
of achieving challenging goals without careful consideration, the failure of M& A 
FRXOGEHFDXVHG%HQ4¶VPHUJHUPD\EHDQH[DPSOHIRUWKLVFRQGLWLRQ 
 
In 2005, Siemens already experienced a drop in its market share which only 
accounted for 5% around of worldwide market share. When this trend is adopted 
into the calculation, a reversed outcome is generated. 5% market share is 
assumed to be the same during the projected periods with steady reducing 
selling price ratio per year, 2%; additionally, BenQ failed to employ restructure 
plan to achieve cost-cutting strategy in Siemens handset business, so COGS 
should be remained at 97% 0f ASP rather than gradually decreases as the earlier 
supposition.  Therefore, to re-evaluate above realistic conditions, negative NPV, 
-790 million euros, is produced (see Panel 7-C).This number excludes terminal 
value due to the negative return continues the whole projected period. Thus to 
calculate the terminal value is meaningless because the investment appears a 
loss business definitely. This result seems more close to the real situation that 
BenQ Siemens faced in 2006 rather than the earlier calculation result of positive 
NPV, 137 million euro.  
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2. Sensitivity Analysis ± Terminal Value 
The terminal value of Siemens Mobile Division in 2011 and thereafter is 
appraised by the Golden Growth Model multiple (g=5%). In the earlier analysis 
at Panel 6-C, the Golden Growth Model multiple, 18.9, is used to estimate the 
¼PLOOLRQFDVKLQIORZV+RZHYHULIWKHJURZWKUDWHLVWKHJURZWKPXOWLSOH
is calculated by 18, the terminal vDOXH ZRXOG EH GHFOLQHG E\ ¼ PLOOLRQ
Likewise, this analysis is assumed to hold everything constant except for the 
Golden Growth Model multiple. While BenQ SiemeQV¶V UHDO VWDWH LV FRQVLGHUHG
with finite timeline (no terminal value), the loss would be dimLQLVKHG E\ ¼
million. It means cash flow of the last year in the projected period could be a 
major role to contribute the value which influents the valuation estimate.  
 
3. Sensitivity Analysis ± Cost of Capital 
If BenQ acquires Siemens Mobile business, to pursue a growth strategy is 
required for future development of company. Likewise, higher return is desirable 
for shareholders due to the existence of higher risks on the market. Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR), the simple method as the baseline to measure whether or 
not the discount rate is required to be higher.  The IRR for this acquisition is 
calculated as follows based on the cash flow that are listed in Panel 6-C and 
¼PLOOLRQLQLQYHVWPHQWFDSLWDO7KRVHFRQGLWLRQVSURYLGHWKHDQVZHUWKat the 
investment has IRR, 1%, which is lower than appropriate discount rate (WACC), 
10.55%. In other words, according to IRR decision rule, this acquisition should 
not be undertaken because it accompanies higher cost of capital without 
profitability in the future. 
 
NPV=-760+[-436/(1+IRR)]+[-171.6/(1+IRR)^2]-71.6/(1+IRR)^3  
        -6.6/(1+IRR)^4 +1203.4/(1+IRR)^5 
IRR=1% 
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Table 5: Mobile Phone Market Demand Forecast 
Mobile Phone Market Demand Forecast 
unit: m handsets 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Worldwide Market potential 772 817 864 914 967 1023 
BenQ Siemens Market Share 42.46 44.92 56.17 59.43 67.71 71.64 
Remark: 
1.Worldwide market potential is assumed to increase at 5.8% average growth rate ;  
2.BenQ Siemens market share is assumed to be 5.5% between 2005 and 2006 ; 
   6.5% market share is expected to be achieved from 2007 to 2010 
Source: Nokia/BenQ 2005 annual report 
 
Table 6: Estimating Siemens Mobile Division Value Using DCF Analysis with WACC 
 
Estimate the Amount and Timing of the Planning Period Future Cash Flows 
Panel 6-A: Pro Forma Financial Statements 
 
Pre-
Acquisition 
Post-
Acquisition Pro Forma Income Statement 
8QLWP¼ 2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Revenue 4137 4137 4377 5473 5791 6598 6981 
Cost of Goods Sold 4013 4013 4246 5254 5501 6268 6562 
Gross Profit 124 124 131 219 290 330 419 
Research and Development  165 165 175 219 203 231 244 
Selling, General and 
Administrative 250 250 200 180 150 100 100 
Other income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EBIT -291 -291 -384 -191 -63 -1 75 
Interest Expense 0 0 9 7 5 4 4 
Tax @ 25% (2005) 0 0 0 0 0 15 20 
Net(loss) Income -291 -291 -210 -198 -68 -20 51 
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Panel 6-B: Cash Flow Estimate 
8QLWP¼ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Net Operating Income -291 -384 -191 -63 -1 75 
Less:Taxes @ 25% 0 0 0 0 0 18 
NOPAT -291 -384 -191 -63 -1 57 
Plus: Depreciation 0 0 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 
Operating Cash Flow -291 -384 -180.6 -52.6 9.4 67.4 
Less:Changes in Net Working Capital 0 52 -9 19 16 7 
Less:Capital Expenditure in fixed assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Free Cash Flow -291 -436 -171.6 -71.6 -6.6 60.4 
(continued) 
Pre-
Acquisition 
Post-
Acquisition Base Line Pro Forma Balance Sheet 
 8QLWP¼ 2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Current Assets 
        Cash and Cash Equivalent 
  
58 58 58 58 58 
 Inventory 104 104 107 128 107 143 140 
 Account Receivable 89 89 100 125 130 140 160 
 Fixed Assets 
        Property, Plant and Equipment 52 52 52 41.6 31.2 20.8 10.4 
 Depreciation 
  
10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 
 Net Property, Plant, and Equipment 52 52 41.6 31.2 20.8 10.4 0 
 Intangible Assets 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
 Total Assets 445 445 507 542 516 551 558 
        Current Liability 228 228 248 303 320 350 360 
 Long-Term Liability 
        Bank Loan@ 6% 0 0 150 120 85 70 65 
 Other liability 61 61 59 69 61 81 83 
 Total Liabilities 289 289 457 492 466 501 508 
 Equity 0 50 50 50 50 50 50 
 Total Liabilities and Equity 289 339 507 542 516 551 558 
45 
 
Panel 6-C: Divisional Value 
Updated Value  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (in millions of euro) 
Free Cash Flow of Assets 
 
-436 -171.6 -71.6 -6.6 60.4 
Terminal Value of Assets 
 
    
 
  1143 
Discount @10.55% for P.V. 0 -347.4 -156.3 -47.6 -0.7 905 
PV Value (Total) 137           
 
Table 7: Estimating Siemens Mobile Division Value Using DCF Analysis with WACC(Sensitivity Analysis) 
Panel 7-A: Pro Forma Financial Statements 
 
Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition Pro Forma Income Statement 
8QLWP¼ 2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Revenue 3761 3761 3941 4127 4321 4526 4743 
Cost of Goods Sold 3648 3648 3823 4003 4192 4345 4554 
Gross Profit 113 113 118 124 130 181 190 
Research and Development  150 150 158 165 151 158 166 
Selling, General and Administrative 250 250 200 180 150 100 100 
Other income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EBIT -288 -288 -384 -191 -172 -77 -76 
Interest Expense 0 0 9 7 5 4 0 
Tax @ 25% (2005) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net(loss) Income -288 -288 -210 -198 -177 -82 -76 
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Panel 7-B: Cash Flow Estimate 
Unit: P¼ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Net Operating Income -280 -384 -191 -171 -78 -77 
Less: Taxes @ 25% 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NOPAT -280 -384 -191 -171 -78 -77 
Plus: Depreciation 0 0 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 
Operating Cash Flow -280 -384 -180.6 -160.6 -67.6 -66.6 
Less: Changes in Net Working Capital 0 52 -9 19 16 7 
Less: Capital Expenditure in fixed assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Free Cash Flow -280 -436 -171.6 -179.6 -83.6 -73.6 
 
Panel 7-C: Divisional Value 
Updated Value  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (in millions of euro) 
Free Cash Flow of Assets 
 
-436 -171.6 -179.6 -83.6 -73.6 
Terminal Value of Assets 
 
    
 
  0 
Discount @10.55% for P.V. 0 -394.4 -140.43 -130 -82 -44.5 
PV Value (Total) -790           
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Table 8: Market Multiples 
Panel 8-A: Equity Multiple 
Equity Multiples Nokia Motorola 
Sony 
Ericsson Average 
Price/1Y Sales 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.9 
Price/2Y Sales 1.9 1.4 2.8 2.0 
Price/1Y Asset 2.6 1.3 1.9 1.9 
Price/2Y Asset 2.6 1.4 2.0 2.0 
 
Panel 8-B: Total Capital Multiples 
Total Capital Nokia Motorola 
Sony 
Ericsson Average 
EV/1Y Sales 1.9 1.7 3.06 2.2 
EV/2Y Sales 2 1.8 3.3 2.4 
EV/1Y Asset 2.9 1.8 2.2 2.3 
EV/2Y Asset 2.9 1.9 2.4 2.4 
 
Panel 8-C: Expected Share Price of Siemens Mobile Division  
 8-C-A 
(1)Averaged 
Multiples 
(2)Siemens 
handset Share 
SULFH¼ (3)Weight 
(4)=(1)*(2)*(3) 
Total 
Price/1Y 
Sales 1.9 0.7 30% 0.4 
Price/2Y 
Sales 2.0 0.7 20% 0.3 
Price/1Y 
Asset 1.9 0.7 30% 0.4 
Price/2Y 
Asset 2.0 0.7 20% 0.3 
Expected 
Share Value   1.4 
 8-C-B 
(1)Averaged 
Multiples 
(2)Siemens 
Handset 
(9P¼ (3)Weight 
(4)=(1)*(2)*(3) 
Total 
EV/1Y Sales 2 9884 30% 5930.40 
EV/2Y Sales 2.2 9884 20% 4348.96 
EV/1Y Asset  2.1 9884 30% 6226.92 
EV/2Y Asset 2.2 9884 20% 4348.96 
Expected EV 
  
20855.24 
Less: liability 4899 
Expected 
Equity Value 15956 
Number  of 
Shares  891,075,711 
Expected 
Share Value 18 
 
Panel 8-D: The Final Expected Share Value of Siemens Handset Division 
¼1.4*40% + ¼18*60%=¼11.36 
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4.2 Market Multiple Approach 
There are two multiples applied in the calculation. The first one is the equity 
multiple. It equals the figure that common share price divided by specific 
numbers on the financial statement, such as price/EPS, price/sales, and 
price/assets. The other is the total capital multiple. It can be used to decrease 
the distortion of these companies if their capitals structures appear varied 
patterns. This multiple is produced by enterprise value divided by sales and 
assets (Stampf et al.1992). However, because mobile division is a loss-making 
business which brings negative LPSDFW WR6LHPHQV$*JURXS¶V (36 WKHUHIRUH
the PE ratio is not adopted here. Due to the lack of detailed financial statement 
of Siemens mobile division, its related financial figures, such as asset value 
which is calculated here, are assumed to be proportionately equal to the weight 
of its divisional sales to Siemens AG revenue in total, 6%, in this analysis. 
 
On the other hand, Nokia, Motorola, and Sony Ericsson are selected as the 
comparable firms to Siemens mobile division. In these three comparables, Nokia 
and Motorola are profitable company; however, Sony Ericsson seems to have a 
more similar background with BenQ-Siemens. Ericsson, the Swedish telecoms 
equipment maker, desired a merger to save its loss-making handset division. 
Meanwhile, Sony, was a marginal handset supplier. A merger from joint venture 
ZDVIRUPHGLQ'RPLQLF:0RUHRYHUDQHZILUP³6RQ\ (ULFVVRQ´
also experienced a business loss period after the merger. In 2004, Sony Ericsson 
finally turned around to be a profitable company (Foo F.,2001).  
 
In the Panel 8-A, Price/1Y Sales represents the 2004 market price divided by 
2004 sales; Price/2Y Sales depicts 2004 market price divided by the averaged 
sales of 2004 and 2003. Likewise, the following columns of Price/Asset ratios are 
listed and calculated in the same way. The averages are produced and then 
given weights which represent the importance in various levels. The year which 
closes to the date of acquisition, 2005, is considered as priority to be assigned 
higher weights.  In other words, the ratios of 2004 would be given higher weight 
than the average ratio of 2004 and 2003. Moreover, the weight of sales directly 
links with profitability performance which would be also offered more weights 
than the asset ratio. These rules are applied to Panel 8-B as well. Furthermore, 
in Panel 8-B, enterprise value (EV) is the sum of debt and all equity at market 
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value lessen cash and cash equivalent. Moreover, EV here stands for the mobile 
division value.  
 
Panel 8-C lists the calculation which is composed by four parts. The first element 
is the averaged multiples of comparable firms. The second element is the 
Siemens handset division share price and divisional value (EV) separately. This 
FROXPQDVVXPHVWKDWPRELOHGLYLVLRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWhe share price is as same 
as the ratio of divisional revenue to Siemens group (see 8-C-A). Moreover, in the 
8-C-B, EV of handset division is calculated at certain percentage of Siemens 
Group EV, which is assumed to be as same as the ratio of divisional revenue to 
Siemens group. Then the fourth element is multiplied by averaged multipliers, 
different weights and the handset divisional value. Then the expected total EV 
deducts liability to generate the expected equity value. The outcome of expected 
share price is produced by expected equity value divided by the number of 
outstanding shares. The weights here are also assigned according to the same 
rule in Panel 8-A and 8-B. The results disclose the expected share price of 
Siemens mobile division in terms of equity multiple and total capital multiples 
individually. As a result, as what Panel 8-D demonstrates, the expected share 
price in equity multiples would be multiplied by 40% weight in equity multiple 
and 60% weight in capital individually.  After that, the expected share value of 
Siemens mobile GLYLVLRQLVJHQHUDWHGDW¼LQWRWDO7KHUHDVRQWRJLYH
and 60% weights individually is because the comparable firms are in debt; under 
this condition, the capital multiple is considered to be an evaluation tool which is 
less influenced by debt than the equity multiple. Therefore, the total capital 
multiple is assigned with more weights than the equity multiple at this 
evaluation. 
 
4.3 Comparison of Financial Evaluation 
 
It is obvious that DCF analysis as well as a valuation which employ  
comparables-based multiples are implemented here to supplement each other. 
When the analysis comes out the figures, it still left with problems of how to 
select these estimates with utilising certain judgement to arrive at the final 
investment conclusion. The judgement is achieved by the quality of available 
information and the evaluation purpose- does this investment is worth for BenQ 
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to acquire a loss-making business, although Siemens is an attractive brand 
name to consumer product market?  
 
In the late 2006, BenQ-Siemens already suffered a huge lose around 840 million 
euros in the first year of post-merger. If we compare outcomes of DCF and 
FRPSDUDEOHPXOWLSOHVPHWKRGRORJLHVZLWK%HQ4¶V UHDO VLWXDWLRQ WKHGLIIHUHQFHV
are showed apparently. 
 
The reality is that using DCF requires rough estimate of future free cash flow and 
discount rate. An optimistic projection to future business indeed influences 
investment value a lot. A fixed selling price, fixed cost of goods sold, and even 
projected market share which brings an attractive investment with high NPV 
showed a strong contrast to BenQ-6LHPHQV¶VSRVW-merger real situation. When 
the market share did not remain in the same position or even decline than 
before, selling price fall down, and cost-cutting policy in an organisation did not 
implement well, an valuable investment which was earlier expected became a 
serious damage to the acquirer finally.  
 
Utilising valuations ratios to appraise investment value can avoid dramatic 
projections; in particular, these projections of cash flow and discount rate are 
not easy to be accurate all the time. However, to identify comparable transitions  
or comparable firms are challenging. Because each investment in different 
timeline has its unique value which is difficult to be quantified completely. BenQ 
is a relatively smaller company to Siemens AG group, but it chose to take over 
Siemens handset division. It is a rare case in the M&A historical record. On the 
other hand, to select a set of comparable companies for BenQ in the same field 
PLJKWEHQRWGLIILFXOW EXW WRDFTXLUHDELJJHUEXVLQHVV WKDQ%HQ4¶VRZQVFDOH
with specific enterprise purpose is not easy to search comparables. Moreover, a 
loss-making Siemens handset business is hard to find similar comparable, 
because Noika and Motorola are profitable companies; although Ericsson was a 
loss-PDNLQJ ILUP EHIRUH WKH PHUJHU ZLWK 6RQ\ WKHVH WZR ILUPV¶ VFDOHV DUH
relatively equivalent than the scale difference between BenQ and Siemens. This 
is also the reason why to apply the average value of Nokia, Motorola, and Sony 
Ericsson together in the ratio valuation. Because to search a perfect comparable 
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in every aspect is approximately impossible, the selection is likely to comprise a 
subjective element to some extent. 
 
Panel 8-D demonstrates BenQ-Siemens share value which is a positive sign as 
well to this merger. But real share value to BenQ in the post-merger did not 
SHUIRUP D JRRG WUHQG %HQ4¶V RZQ ILQDQFLDO VWUXFWXUHZLWK XQH[SHFWHG PRELOH
market reversal also contributed the falling share value. In other words, to select 
an appropriate metric to assess an investment also depends on the supposition 
that a scaled value of the metric where the investment attributes is the scaling 
YDULDEOHV%HQ4¶V ILQDQFLDOSRVLWLRQ LV UHODWLYHO\ZHDNWRVXSSRUt this merger to 
be successful because it is a small business to acquire a big one. We might 
explain that in reality, the metric value is impossible completely equal the 
LQYHVWPHQWDWWULEXWHVDQGWKHQFRQWULEXWHWR%HQ4¶VHYDOXDWLRQWRZDUG6LHPHQV
handset division in the beginning. This is also the reason why the weights are 
given during the calculation process of market comparable method. It might be 
subjective but necessary. 
 
5. Discussion  
7KH0RWLYHVRI%HQ4¶V$FTXLULQJ6LHPHQV0RELOH%XVLQHVV 
In reality, handset suppliers seeking for collaboration in terms of efficient 
resource utilisation and co-branding benefit is not uncommon; but the actual 
effect is probably disputable. Take the acquisition of Sony and Ericsson as an 
example. The integration of WKHVH WZR FRPSDQLHV¶ KDQGVHW EXVLQHVV LQLWLDOO\
brought a significant sales loss of 28%, registering a mere 6 million shipment 
volume, which undermined its previously projected economic benefits on the 
market (Foo F., 2001). This acquisition took several years for the new company, 
Sony Ericsson, to be directed on the right track. In particular, this event was not 
a case of the small firm taking over a larger one but a combination of two 
entities with an equivalent business scale. To some extent, mergers and 
acquisitions incorporate diverse challenges and uncertainties on a case by case 
basis. The motives for BenQ in completing this merger were as follows: 
 
First of all, building and developing a global brand. This is the most crucial driver 
in this M&A. In the previous three years, marketing expenditures cost BenQ 
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roughly ¼ PLOOLRQ $V D JHQHUDO UXOH WR REWDLQ RQH FRPSDQ\¶V EUDQG IRU
marketing, 2% of its sales has to be paid as the royalties. If BenQ has to pay for 
³%HQ4-6LHPHQV´ IRU  \HDUV WKH OLFHQVH fee would be 450 million. From this 
stance, the acquisition seems valuable to BenQ, which strongly desired a 
powerful brand name. In addition, to acquire key technology contains patents 
and experienced R&D teams%HQ4EHOLHYHGWKDW6LHPHQV¶VFRUHSDWHQWVsuch 
as 3G, GPRS, and GSM, and its focus on technology development is not only 
significantly helpful to future development of new products, but also improve 
%HQ4¶V LQQRYDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ Thirdly, the aim was in expanding geographical 
markets and increasing PDUNHW VKDUH $VLD LV %HQ4¶V FKLHI PDUNHWSODFH ZKLOH
Siemens hold stronger sales channels in Europe and Latin America. Therefore, 
the integration of these two firms can be completed to reinforce the global 
platform. At the same time, the total outputs thaW XQGHU WKHPDUN RI ³%HQ4-
6LHPHQV´ H[WHQGHG %HQ4¶V EUDQG DZDUHQHVV WR PRUH FRQVXPHUV (Wei L.Y., 
2005). 
 
)LQDOO\ WKHPHUJHUZDV WR HQKDQFH%HQ4¶V VFDOH RI HFRQRPLFV %HQ4 DLPV DW
becoming a well-NQRZQ JOREDO EUDQG VLQFH WKH EUDQG¶V HDUO\ GD\V LQ 
However, the huge amount of marketing expenditure and relatively short-term 
brand cultivation cannot afford to cope with competition coming from other 
SRZHUIXOEUDQGHTXLWLHV$VWKHVKLSPHQWRI%HQ4¶VRZQEUDQGRIKDQGVHWVZDV
extraordinarily small, it did not bring sufficient visibility to consumers given the 
relevant marketing expenditure.  But, when the quantities are combined with 
shipments of Siemens mobile division, projected to be 40 million to 50 million 
units, the brand visibility will be highly intensified. 
 
5.2 Failures to the Merger 
Conversely, the exit from this M&A by BenQ in 2006 caused controversial 
discussion not only in Taiwan but in Germany. Taiwan market was concerned 
that if local manufacturing suppliers cannot break the current destiny of OEM 
and ODM business models to pursue establishment of brand equity 
establishment successfully in the global marketplace. In contrast, Siemens and 
the German society protested against this behaviour because it damaged 
HPSOR\HHV¶ ULJKWV IRU MREV DQG WKH 6Lemens AG group was also blamed for 
dealing with its handset business, which was tough to be salvage, in wrong and 
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unfair way (Wearden G., 2007). To examine the failure of this case, many aspects 
of considerations have to be covered to discover implicated clues and causes. 
 
)LUVWRIDOOWKHGHFUHDVHRILWVRZQEXVLQHVVGHVWDELOLVHG%HQ4¶VILQDQFHVLWXDWLRQ
%HIRUH WKH IRUPDO DFTXLVLWLRQ %HQ4¶V RZQ EXVLQHss had experienced a ¼22 
million sales loss in the earlier three quarters, and this performance had already 
destabilised its original financial position in 2005. Likewise, this misfortune had 
continued to spread in 2006, with the handset market share, regardless whether 
they are sold under the BenQ or BenQ-Siemens brand, shrinking by 3% in total 
as compared to pre-acquisition figures. Moreover, its own business of handset 
OEM manufacturing seemed to be affected due to its intention to cultivate a 
brand for the mobile devices. In all probability, BenQ might have already been 
viewed as a potential competitor by its original OEM customers such as Motorola, 
and this phenomenon could be observed from the reduction in its orders, which 
prompted BenQ to look for other cooperative partners (Wei L.Y., 2005). 
According to the definition of M&A by Buckley P.J. (2002), this case fits in not 
only under horizontal but also vertical merger classification, because BenQ and 
Siemens sold similar products in the same field. Although Siemens was not 
%HQ4¶V RULJLQDO 2(0 FXVWRPHU %HQ4¶V manufacturing ability along with 
6LHPHQV¶V H[LVWLQJPDUNHWLQJ SODWIRUPDSSDUHQWO\ WKUHDWHQHG%HQ4¶V 2(0
mobile phone customers, who did not undertake production but were Siemens 
competitors. This influence, I believed, should be incorporated as a form of 
vertical forward merger. Meanwhile, it could be found that when horizontal and 
vertical merger co-exist, conflict may come before synergy; in particular, if the  
company run specific business patterns on the market. 
 
In addition, the culture difference caused the difficulty in integration (Wei L.Y., 
2005). As Table 9 shows, Germany has a lower score in power distance and long 
term orientation but quite a high and masculinity compared with Taiwan. 
Meanwhile, both countries appear to the same degree in uncertainty avoidance. 
The above summary points out the roots of cultural differences. In other words, 
German believes that hierarchy is designed for convenience with the tendency of 
tasks prevailing over relationships. They respect traditional values and take 
social obligation seriously, with the characteristics of assertiveness and 
decisiveness, shown to be a little bit higher tendency than Taiwan figures. 
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Conversely, Taiwanese have a higher intention to be a follower rather than a 
creator, and is concerned more with relationship maintenance rather than task 
achievement. Meanwhile, the people in Taiwan stress on the future orientation of 
SHUVHYHUDQFH DQG WKULIW%HVLGHV WKH JDSEHWZHHQPDQ¶V YDOXHV DQGZRPDQ¶V
values is smaller in Taiwan than in Germany. Therefore, the management 
activity in one country is culturally dependent, which means what works in one 
country may be not fit in another; in particular, when the obvious difference 
exists in the eastern and western countries. In order to keep talented people in 
the mobile division and show respect for autonomy, BenQ appointed its former 
executive ± Chemens Joos as the new executive who was in charge of the 
business operations in the new subsidiary, BenQ Mobile. The purpose conducting 
this management practice, in terms of keeping original middle and top managers, 
also includes retaining good communication with union organisation. However, 
this management pattern did not bring any interaction between the parent 
company and its subsidiary and instead enlarged the detrimental gap. 
Assertiveness was probably another problem associated with compromise 
regardless of product design or business goal. Besides, the Taiwanese follows a 
hierarchy and feedback system, which goes along with each layer; but a German 
with high confidence has gotten used to breaking the line, which often makes 
other members lose faces and worsen the relationship and cooperation on both 
side. 
 
Table 9: Geert Hofstede Culture Dimensions-Germany and Taiwan 
  
 Resource: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_germany.shtml 
 Resource: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_taiwan.shtml 
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Moreover, delay in production development weakens the result of integration. 
Handset technology involves the development of both hardware and software, 
whereas the design of software cannot fit in the mobile phone as what BenQ 
expected in the beginning and after it passed the test condition which resulted in 
the order loss in retailer market. Meanwhile, the tempo of changing market 
cannot accept an extremely complex design which is out of date and test 
procedures without any flexibility and compromise which protracted time to 
market. Thus, there were merely two models which are being mass production. 
Conversely, failed projects were extremely costly but gained nothing. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This was a rare case in the record of M&A activities because BenQ, a small entity, 
took over Siemens Mobile Device Division, a larger business unit. According to 
<+ <HK  ³*URZLQJ VWURQJ PXVW FRPH EHIRUH JURZLQJ ELJ $ KXJH
DPRXQWRIPRQH\LVUHTXLUHGWRGHDOZLWKIXWXUHXQFHUWDLQWLHV´,QRWKHUZRUGV
BenQ must be strong in its financial operation with quite healthy and stable 
business growth.  
 
The motives of this acquisition displayed the different stances of Siemens and 
BenQ. First of all, Klaus Kleinfeld, the CEO of Siemens AG, took over this position 
in 2005 and aggressively enforced the restructuring plan in order to bring 
Siemens AG back into profits. Therefore, addressing the concern with regard to 
sectors that fail to achieve business goals and undermining business risk through 
top managers is an essential motive (Amihud et al. 1981) for this M&A. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WRS PDQDJHUV¶ KHOG RYHU-optimistic manners with respect of 
Siemens AG, in believing that BenQ can afford to turn the loss-making mobile 
GLYLVLRQDURXQGZKHUH6LHPHQV$*IDLOHGDW WKHVDPHWLPH%HQ4¶VPDQDJHUV
overestimated their capability to deal with complicated cross-board business 
operation and managerial issues during the integration of two firms; this 
VLWXDWLRQ LV FDOOHG ³KXEULV+\SRWKHVLV´ 5ROO%HQ4ZRXOG OLNH WRSXUVXH
fast sales growth with a strong brand, accompanying managers¶ belief of their 
rewards co-related with sales to some extent, and it is believed a case of the 
³*URZWK0D[LPLVDWLRQ+\SRWKHVLV´PHQWLRQHGE\0XOOHU 
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The behaviour of suspending obligatory capital injection in this takeover by BenQ 
raised another surmise in the market. Since BenQ acquired the Siemens mobile 
division, the average loss per day was 2.3 million complying with its share price 
IDOOLQJIURP17'WR17'LQWKHHQG7KHVKULQNRI%HQ4¶VVKULQNLQJPDUNHW
value endangered its position because the low price shares were at risk to be 
acquired unfriendly in a hostile manner by other competitors. If this situation 
happens, BenQ would not only lose its own business along with difficulties in 
liquidation but also jeopardize its ownership in other subsidiaries. Some theories 
suggested that M&A activity can weaken the principle-agency problem because 
managers would perform better to avoid being acquired. However, if the 
acquirer does not select and evaluate the target company well, it may become 
RWKHU FRPSHWLWRUV¶SUH\as well. Consequently, the principle-agency problem is 
reinforced in the organisation due to the wrong investment decision. Likewise, as 
Jenson (1986) highlighted that wrong utilisation of free cash flow in a takeover 
may lead to another conflict between managers and shareholders. 
 
Management model affects the successful integration in the post merger. It is 
difficult to judge whether the acquisition is a good investment or not at that 
moment, but to manage it in an appropriate manner is an alternative that can be 
FKRVHQDIWHUZDUG³7KHXQGHUO\LQJEHOLHILVWKDWWKHVRRQHUWKHLQWHJUDWLRQHIIRUW
FRPHVWRDQHQGWKHVRRQHUWKHEXVLQHVVFDQSURFHHGZLWKµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶
Alternatively stated, speedy integration is risky to operations and can lead to 
untagged synergy potential due to the limited knowledge merger parties have 
ZLWKUHJDUGHGHDFKRWKHU¶VRSHUDWLRQV´3DSDWKDQDVVLV$3.26) 
 
$V KDV EHHQ PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH HDUOLHU SDJHV %HQ4¶V SDUHQW FRPSDQ\
implemented a gradual revolutionary style in cross-board management. BenQ 
mobile (Siemens Mobile Division renamed in the post acquisition) enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy in terms of management, practices, and culture. Yet, the 
FRPSDQ\¶VRSHUDWLRQHIILFLHQF\ZDVH[WUHPHly minimised and it went along with 
financial destabilisation. In reality, to appoint the same group of managers who 
came from a former loss-making division and to ask them to turn the business 
around by bringing efficient changes to the organisation was a big mistake by 
BenQ, which incorrectly weighed in its managerial strategy. At the same time, 
BenQ itself lacked sufficient information associating with Siemens union which 
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possess strong power to intervene in the decision-making process. To 
underestimate the union organisation in Germany is another fault. It caused the 
related revolutionary policies that were beneficial to BenQ business being 
hindered. A slow integrated process accompanies inherent strains because 
mutual intentions relating to the acceptanFHRIHDFKRWKHU¶VEHVWSUDFWLFHVDQG
underperforming activities required to be adjusted. Thus, to demand a fully 
consolidated culture and operation takes lots of time and is definitely a dilemma. 
Losing in timing equals losing the market. Most important of all, the adoption of 
management patterns significantly affects the outcome of complex challenges 
encountered. 
However, how to choose managerial practice to speed up the integration in 
terms of resource transfer and declining exposure to the negative effects 
depends on the thorough understanding of the target company that the acquirer 
LQWHQGV WR EX\ ³'XH GLOLJHQFH´ LV WKH EHVW WRRO WR SURYLGH UHODWHG LQIRUPDWLRQ
which supports the evaluation. As a result, the acquirer has its responsibility to 
examine the DFFXUDF\ LQ WKH DFTXLVLWLRQ DJUHHPHQW DQG IXOILO LQYHVWRUV¶
requirements and concerns. After all, the incompleteness of due diligence not 
only wrongly connect with performance of post-acquisition which provides 
incorrect financial projections to evaluation in pre-acquisition but also 
underestimate business risks. Under this circumstance, it will contribute to the 
IDLOXUHRIWKHPHUJHUDQGGLPLQLVKVKDUHKROGHUV¶SURILWVXOWLPDWHO\ 
 
There is no single element that can accomplish a perfect investigation associated 
with the value of an acquisition. The financial evaluation of DCF approach in 
terms of WACC requires many presuppositions to work out the result which 
demands as much objective information as possible to overcome subject factors. 
Likewise, the use of the Market Multiple approach also requires detailed 
information of market competition with similar comparators and relatively 
rational reflections of market and investors for decreasing errors possibly 
occurred in the findings. 
 
On the other hand, regardless of the high risk and failure rate in the M&A waves, 
there are still many companies seeking powerful growth through acquisitions. 
The major driver, I personally believe, are investment banks which play key 
roles to dominate the M&A market.  The emergence of investment bank 
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accelerates the transaction of M&A. In many cases, sellers hire advisors to 
search for the buyers. Through the successful match up, the intermediaries 
obtain at least 1% of transaction amount and it is quite a profitable business 
scope in banking field (Mergers & Acquisitions, 2009). Although buyers can also 
save time and money to acquire representation of the target firm through 
investment banks, to those intermediaries, to some extent, target firms are their 
products with attractive packaging for promotion. The professional consultancy 
on negotiation and valuation is the existential value of those advisors. Similarly, 
screening exactly useful analysis and ignore dissembling information demand the 
managers of companies to express interests in acquisition to conduct well. 
Meanwhile, any possibility that managers and intermediaries both pursue the 
same interests and then put their mutual interests at the expense of 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ YDOXH FUHDWLRQ WR ZRUVHQ principle-agency problem is a crucial 
topic for further investigation. Moreover, to some extent, M&A activity involves 
an opposite stance against corporate social responsibility (CSR). When the firm 
faces fierce competition on the market and has no choice but implements cost-
cutting measurement for restructuring, should the social obligation fulfilment 
RYHU D ILUP¶V SURILWDELOLW\" 7KH FRQWURYHUVLDO LVVXH FDQ DOVR EULQJ in the 
impressive implication and deepen the discussion as well. 
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